WEKO3
アイテム
Correlated quantal responses and equilibrium selection
http://hdl.handle.net/10131/3093
http://hdl.handle.net/10131/3093560717ad-bcc7-4ca1-b3d6-91bc48c5ac0a
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
|
|
|
| アイテムタイプ | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2007-10-19 | |||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||
| タイトル | Correlated quantal responses and equilibrium selection | |||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 主題 | global game; quantal response equilibrium(en) | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | journal article | |||||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||
| 著者 |
Ui, Takashi
× Ui, Takashi
|
|||||||
| 抄録 | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||
| 内容記述 | This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturbances. It explains the connection between the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria, where large noise is required, and the uniqueness of equilibria in global games, where small noise is required. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. | |||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| 書誌情報 |
en : Games and Economic Behavior 巻 57, 号 2, p. 361-369, ページ数 9, 発行日 2006-11-01 |
|||||||
| ISSN | ||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | PISSN | |||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 08998256 | |||||||
| DOI | ||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isVersionOf | |||||||
| 識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||||
| 関連識別子 | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.018 | |||||||
| 権利 | ||||||||
| 権利情報 | NOTICE: This is the author's version of a work accepted for publication by Elsevier. Changes resulting from the publishing process, including peer review, editing, corrections, structual formatting and other quality control mechanisms, may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been to this work since it was submitted for publication. | |||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||||
| 出版タイプ | AM | |||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||
| 出版者 | Academic Press Inc. Elsevier Science | |||||||