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Robust equilibria of potential games
http://hdl.handle.net/10131/3085
http://hdl.handle.net/10131/308543f09d7e-e140-495d-ad9a-72b1c7c15e8a
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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Ui2001.pdf (107.9 kB)
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Item type | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2007-10-19 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Robust equilibria of potential games | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Incomplete information, refinements, robustness, potential games | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
資源タイプ | journal article | |||||
著者 |
Ui, Takashi
× Ui, Takashi |
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著者(ヨミ) | ||||||
識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||
識別子 | 163 | |||||
識別子Scheme | e-Rad | |||||
識別子URI | https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/ja/search/?qm=60312815 | |||||
識別子 | 60312815 | |||||
姓名 | ウイ, タカシ | |||||
著者別名 | ||||||
識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||
識別子 | 163 | |||||
識別子Scheme | e-Rad | |||||
識別子URI | https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/ja/search/?qm=60312815 | |||||
識別子 | 60312815 | |||||
姓名 | 宇井, 貴志 | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
Univ Tsukuba, Inst Policy & Planning Sci, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 3058573, Japan = 筑波大学社会工学系 | ||||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | Potential games are games with potential functions. Technically, the potential function defines a refinement concept. We provide justification for this refinement concept using the notion of robustness of equilibria. A Nash equilibrium of a complete information game is said to be robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to the Nash equilibrium. We show that Nash equilibria that maximize potential functions are generically robust. | |||||
書誌情報 |
Econometrica 巻 69, 号 5, p. 1373-1380, 発行日 2001-09 |
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ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 00129682 | |||||
DOI | ||||||
関連タイプ | isVersionOf | |||||
識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
関連識別子 | info:doi/10.1111/1468-0262.00246 | |||||
権利 | ||||||
権利情報 | The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com. | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
出版タイプ | AM | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | Blackwell Publishing Ltd | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | postprint |