@article{oai:ynu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00002030,
 author = {Ui, Takashi},
 issue = {1},
 journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
 month = {Apr},
 note = {application/pdf, postprint, This paper shows that if a game satisfies the sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium provided by Rosen (1965) then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium, which places probability one on the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, it shows that a weaker condition suffices for the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium. The condition generalizes the sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium provided by Neyman (1997) for a potential game with a strictly concave potential function.},
 pages = {1--13},
 title = {Correlated equilibrium and concave games},
 volume = {37},
 year = {2008}
}