@article{oai:ynu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00002029,
 author = {Morris, Stephen and Ui, Takashi},
 issue = {2},
 journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
 month = {Nov},
 note = {application/pdf, postprint, Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provide a characterization of when two games are best-response equivalent. The characterizations exploit a dual relationship between payoff differences and beliefs. Some "potential game" arguments [Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996) 124] rely only on the property that potential games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games. Our results show that a large class of games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games, but are not potential games. Thus we show how some existing potential game arguments can be extended. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.},
 pages = {260--287},
 title = {Best response equivalence},
 volume = {49},
 year = {2004}
}