@article{oai:ynu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00002028,
 author = {Kajii, Atsushi and Ui, Takashi},
 issue = {1},
 journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
 month = {May},
 note = {application/pdf, postprint, This paper considers a two-agent model of trade with multiple priors. Firstly, we characterize the existence of an agreeable bet on some event in terms of the set of priors. It is then shown that the existence of an agreeable bet on some event is a strictly stronger condition than the existence of an agreeable trade, whereas the two conditions are equivalent in the standard Bayesian framework. Secondly, we show that the two conditions are equivalent when the set of priors is the core of a convex capacity. These results are also related to the no trade theorems under asymmetric information. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.},
 pages = {299--305},
 title = {Agreeable bets with multiple priors},
 volume = {128},
 year = {2006}
}