@article{oai:ynu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00002026,
 author = {Kajii, Atsushi and Ui, Takashi},
 issue = {3},
 journal = {Japanese Economic Review},
 month = {Sep},
 note = {application/pdf, preprint, We present a model of incomplete information games, where each player is endowed with a set of priors. Upon arrival of private information, it is assumed that each player "updates" his set of priors to a set of posterior beliefs, and then evaluates his actions by the most pessimistic posterior beliefs. So each player's preferences may exhibit aversion to ambiguity or uncertainty. We define a couple of equilibrium concepts, establish existence results for them, and demonstrate by examples how players' views on uncertainty about the environment affect the strategic outcomes.},
 pages = {332--351},
 title = {Incomplete information games with multiple priors},
 volume = {56},
 year = {2005}
}