

From Implementation to Planning:
A Case Study of “Reverse Policy Cycle” of Recovery
of Allied Internees and Early Repatriation in
Postwar Japan

政策の実施から政策の計画へ
—戦後初期の連合国抑留者の救出および引揚げ政策に見る
政策の「逆循環」—

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Abstract

A study about the policy cycle forms the core of modern policy sciences. The policy cycle is an analytical model to help us understand how public policies evolve. In general, policy cycle models comprise three stages of policy process: initiation, decision, and implementation. Policy initiation is where a policy starts, and implementation is where the same policy ends. Despite its conceptual clarity, this model is very problematic in the real world.

In actuality, policies develop in multiple confused ways. One such case is

the repatriation of U.S. soldiers after the termination of the WWII in the Pacific. At a glance, the repatriation program might seem to be a case for policy cycle par excellence. Contrary to existing accounts, this article argues that the way in which repatriation evolved was not the result of previous preparations. It was rather through the actual unfolding of events.

The repatriation started from implementation (of recovery of Allied POWs). A major decision was then hastily made, and only afterwards, was the proper planning initiated. The cycle, therefore, started with implementation and ended with formulation. As counter-intuitive as it may sound, this article argues that this is how the actual policy process may evolve. This is especially so at the lower levels of policymaking, where policies face many arbitrary interventions, interruptions, confusions, risks, uncertainties and improvisations.

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1. Introduction

A study about the policy cycle forms the core of modern policy sciences. The policy cycle is an analytical model, which helps us understand how public policies evolve. In general, policy cycle models comprise following three stages:

policy initiation, policy decision and policy implementation (Iwasaki 2012, 19; Akiyoshi 2010, 8; Yakushiji 1988, 104; Shiratori 1990, 15; Adachi 2009, 124). Policy initiation or formulation is a place where policy starts. Implementation is a place where the same policy ends.

David Easton is one of the foremost advocates of the policy cycle analysis in political science. He denotes that policy evolves along the lines of input and output to and from a political system (1966). In an elaborated version of his model, Easton defines what the policy inputs and outputs are and how they function. For Easton, inputs are summary variables, which alter, modify or affect the system (1979, 27, 32).

Easton identifies two channels of policy initiation: input of demands and input of support. To simplify his argument, demands are policy agendas. The process of agenda setting is the process of translating external wants into demands. These are pressures, which are relevant and acceptable to the system. His concept however is wider than agenda setting. The second channel is the input of support to the system such as loyalty, but it is set aside here.¹⁾

Harold Lasswell is credited for developing the concept of policy process. He defines two stages of policy input in his seven-stage policy development model as intelligence and recommendation (1956, 2; Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, 197).²⁾ Intelligence is about information gathering, prediction and planning. Recommendation is about promotion of policies and their alternatives to the decision-maker.

Edward Page refers to the two stages of policymaking as two forms of policy intentions: principles and policy lines (2008, 210). Policy principles are often the most usual way, which guide policymakers in drafting their policies. They are widely understood views about how public affairs should be conducted and provide broad guidelines, which can be applied to diverse policies. An

example of such policy principles would be privatization or deregulation. Ideas or convictions about “the invisible hand of the market” or “the Third Way” may also serve well as general policy principles. Politicians often pronounce such general ideas and fight about them on the high political stage, caring little about their detailed application.

Policy lines (or strategies) are more subtle. These are specific kinds of policy intentions, which are developed by policy entrepreneurs (or policy makers), who can identify and exploit opportunities for a policy (Kingdon 1995, 166). They are more like applications of policy principles, and they generally take the form of separate laws each addressing particular problem at hand.

Policy decision-making models have generally emphasized the role of politicians and policy makers. They are engaged in the expression of intentionality of the policy and steer the process of policy initiation through decision onto implementation. In short, policies originate because policy makers carefully define the agenda. They plan the policy and set priorities. Options could be decided upon later, as well as the proper implementation of policies (Hogwood and Gunn 1984).

Despite its conceptual clarity, this model is problematic in the real world. As Paul Pierson stresses, policies are complex and their causal processes may unfold over substantial stretches of time (2004, 13). Sometimes, insignificant factors or unintended effects may end up inverting causal relationships defined in the models of Easton or Lasswell, and elaborated by others (Carpenter 2001).³⁾ Many studies since the introduction of the Simon’s concept of bounded rationality have questioned the extent of narrow instrumental rationality. The same is true with intentionality in policymaking, notwithstanding the importance of arguments over intentionality.

Edward Page is among those who challenge the concept of intentional

origination of policies. He focuses on policy actions, that is, on outcomes of policy processes (Page 2008, 212). Page questions the basic assumptions set forward by Easton or Lasswell. Such state that policy process, or a political system, is a linear, rational and congruent structure separated diachronically by stages. Contrary to other studies on policy origination, Page argues that policy does not originate from intentions. Rather, it comes from implementation. Page built, among others, on the work of Pressman and Wildavsky. Their book *Implementation*, focused on the complexities of application of public policies into practice. Implementation, as a stage, is logically separate from policy origination. Empirical studies of policy implementation or street-level bureaucracies show that implementation and origination are interrelated. They also, however, illustrate that bureaucracies actively contribute to policy origination (Lipsky 1980; Goodin 1982; deLeon 1999).

The linkage between policy output and input is not unknown to system scientists like Easton or Lasswell. They address such a linkage through the concept of policy feedback (Yakushiji 1988, 44; Lerner and Lasswell 1951, vii-x). Their treatment of policy feedback however is ambiguous. It is fused with exogenous policy environment and fades in comparison with their emphasis on the system.

The aim of this paper is not to dwell into the theoretical debates about ontological basis of decision-making systems.⁴⁾ It aims at what Kato Masatoshi might call an, “application to empirical analysis” (2012, 201; 2016, 134). This means, that it focuses on clarification of the process of policy initiation (of repatriation) in the context of postwar Japanese political history. Especially, the paper analyzes the process of recovery of Allied Prisoners of War (POWs) and Civilian Internees (CIs).

Postwar U.S. Occupation policies are a case par excellence for the study

of policy initiation. This is because there was a series of new policies adopted under the program of reform and democratization. The literature about the U.S. and Allied occupation puts ample emphasis on how well the U.S. planned the policies for reform of Japan before the actual start of the occupation (Iokibe 1985; Janssens 1995, 445; Swensson 1966, 28; Ward and Sakamoto 1987, 2; Schonberger 1989, 25; Iriye 1981, 150).

At the same time, however, there is a controversy between the proponents of the argument that the Allies were well prepared for their occupation duties, and those, who argue to the contrary. Those who claim that occupation planning was not well prepared usually take into account the actual unfolding of events (Hellegers 2003, xi; Carruthers 2016). These include crises, contingencies, improvised decisions, risks and uncertainties, as well as other factors not anticipated in the initial postwar planning, but usually encountered on the ground.

This article suggests that repatriation started from implementation (of repatriation of Allied POWs). It was transformed by a major decision about demobilization and repatriation of U.S. military personnel. Proper planning relating to repatriation of foreign residents living in Japan and of Japanese abroad was initiated only afterwards. The cycle, therefore, started with implementation and ended with formulation. This article's arguments may sound counter-intuitive. Together with Page however, the paper asserts that implementation-formulation linkage is how the actual policy process may take place. This may especially be true at the lower levels of policymaking, where it faces many arbitrary interventions, interruptions, confusions, risks, uncertainties and improvisations.

2. Background

Abrupt events are the enemy to bureaucracies. They transform policies and policy environments. They replace carefully planned courses of action with non-planned ad-hoc behavior. They urge for contingency. Decision-making in contingency situations is risky. Outcomes of one's decisions cannot be carefully analyzed. There is no time for lengthy planning meetings and careful factor analysis. At least not those, which might guarantee a separate classification into policy formulation and decision. Stakeholders are not consulted, decisions are provisional and therefore, policy process starts with implementation.

Termination of the war in the Pacific was followed with the phase of post-conflict arrangements generally referred to as the period of "postwar measures" (*sengo shori*). One of the major features of this period was demobilization and repatriation. That is, transformation of soldiers back into citizens and movement of people from the place of residence to their homeland. This article focuses on such a "movement to the homeland", and thus on repatriation. It also acknowledges that both the concept of demobilization and that of repatriation were closely inter-twined.

Most of those on the move were soldiers or civilians either closely associated with the military or they were the benefactors of military policies. Repatriation is, therefore, a word comprising the process of such movement home. One complication is that the term repatriation does not indicate the agency of such movement. It can refer to repatriation of the Japanese from overseas colonies back to Japan, which was the most general understanding. Repatriation also meant movement of alien residents out of Japan, be they former compatriots from Korea, Taiwan, China or others.

Similarly, repatriation may indicate the return of American and other

Allied soldiers home. This also gained some usage at the time. Furthermore, the same word may refer to Allied soldiers and enemy persons detained in wartime prisoner-of-war camps and other such facilities. We can consider all of these processes of returning separately, as they involve different agents engaged in the movement. At the same time however, all these processes interlink with each other both bureaucratically and logistically. They are all fractions of the formulation process of the repatriation policy adopted after the end of the war.

Repatriation appeared little in the discussions about the postwar Allied occupation measures. Directives to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) and from SCAP to the Japanese Government shaped the general direction of repatriation.⁵⁾ None of those policies, however, was encompassing enough to deal with all problems pertaining to repatriation. Diversity of issues associated with movement of peoples made a unitary and consistent policy impossible. Repatriation would thus be undertaken in a piecemeal form, depending on who was going to move where and when.

Acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation by Japan abruptly terminated two parallel processes of mobilization. On the Allied side, it was an impulse for terminating the new draft at home and movement of troops from Europe to the Pacific. On the Japanese side, it paved the way for discontinuation of preparations for homeland defense. With little time for preparation, both sides had to start implementing measures diametrically opposed to the ones they have been long preparing for. The measures dealt with withdrawing of troops, their return to civilian life and transportation of citizens back to their homelands.⁶⁾

As a result, the Allied policy on repatriation divided along the lines of who was the object of the policy. Measures for rescuing imprisoned wartime Allied

military and civilian personnel, would naturally differ from others. There would be a separate policy to treating Allied soldiers returning for demobilization. These were at variance with policies on repatriation of overseas Japanese militaries and civilians. Allied Prisoners of War (POWs) and Civilian Internees (CIs) were high on the list of priorities, while repatriation of Japanese from overseas was low.

These priorities indicate that repatriation policy did evolve in stages. In the first stage, repatriation policy focused on a speedy recovery of Allied POWs. In the second stage, repatriation efforts concentrated on Allied soldiers with high point scores. Only in the third stage, repatriation policy turned to transportation of former enemy aliens from Japan and of Japanese citizens from abroad. Repatriation policy, preoccupying much of the early postwar occupation agenda, thus, started with the Allied nationals, not the Japanese. This article focuses primarily on the first stage. It also provides some insights about the second and third ones.

3. Hasty Preparations

Recovery of Allied POWs and Allied CIs was set as the most urgent priority of the entering occupation armies. MacArthur's U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC) Operations Instructions No. 4, Annex 12, of 31 August 1945 deals exclusively with evacuation and repatriation of POWs.

The Annex had two characters. The first one was internal. It dealt with the occupation Army's own intelligence, reorganization, preparations for implementation and formation of institutional framework. This was for the reception, care, recuperation and repatriation of recovered POWs and CIs. Basic outline plan "Blacklist", which formed the basis of Operations Instructions

No. 4 defined Prisoners of War in its Annex 5f. It specified those persons who have been members of, or persons accompanying the UN (Allied) armed forces, members of armed forces of countries occupied by Japan when serving the Allied purpose, and members of the UN (Allied) merchant marine.⁷⁾ Once they were located and evacuated, authorities no longer referred to them as POWs, but as Recovered Allied Military Personnel (RAMPs).

The Annex defined as Civilian Internees those persons who were detained by the enemy. They did not have a military status and were not nationals of the Japanese Empire as constituted on 10 July 1937.⁸⁾ Collection of information about internment of Allied and especially American POWs had been one part of the continuous effort of military intelligence. Operations Instructions No. 4 estimated 36,000 personnel and 140 camps located in Japan.

MacArthur's headquarters determined the initial procedures for accepting recovered personnel consistent with AFPAC Circular No. 19 and 20 of 9 July 1945. It determined the form and regulations for acceptance of Allied military personnel, and the procedures to locate, rescue, and process prisoners as well as internees. AFPAC trained liaison, recovery and processing teams. Adjutant General and GHQ Special Troops of AFPAC also designed a special project undertaken by Recovered Personnel Detachment, which trained those forces anticipated to participate in landing in Japan.

Liaison teams were small and they would aid Army and Corps Headquarters in communications. About 80 recovery teams including reserve were responsible for location and recovery of about 500 prisoners each. Processing teams staffed four disposition centers and collecting points. Army Forces Western Pacific (AFWESPAC), AFPAC's subordinate supply command, operated most of the final disposition centers. Thus most returnees went through the Philippines.

Air transport was arranged for cases when recovered personnel had to be hospitalized. Otherwise, most transportation was carried out on ships. In effect, Okinawa provided temporary transit points for most of the recovered personnel.⁹⁾ Commands in charge of teams and their operations were the two occupation armies (Sixth and Eighth) and six corps (IX, XI, XIV, I, X, V Amphibious). They were responsible for reconnaissance, care, billeting, food, clothing, medical care, initial processing, establishment of disposition centers and evacuation to the Philippines.

AFWESPAC in Manila was to provide supplies for recovery and processing teams. It also distributed food, clothing, medical supplies and necessary equipment for processing of recoverees. It established disposition centers in the Philippines and a final processing center in Manila. After recuperation, provision by their respective government and final disposition, recoverees went back to their final destination. This was usually their homeland. It included the US, UK, Netherlands and other Allied countries. This was the institutional setup provided for by regulations and measures internal to the Allied armed forces.

The second character of the Annex 12 was external. It consisted of measures required from the Imperial Japanese Government. The institutional setup of UN (Allied) Forces was based extensively on already existing procedures for replacement of combatant units. The new features, such as the training of liaison and recovery teams, were relatively simple tasks. They were much easier than those, which would be necessary if the Japanese Government opted for non-cooperation. The information most urgently needed from the Japanese Government was about the exact location of all POW and internee camps. This included the actual numbers of interned persons. They would meet with little success without such information. It would not matter how well

prepared and planned the Allied reconnaissance and recovery missions might be. Japanese information was coming slowly though. The first compilation showed only 73 camps. Government reports later corrected the number to 94. The U.S. military however noticed irregularities. Further consultations of their own records as well as new reconnaissance and investigations found 33 additional unreported camps, usually under other than Army jurisdiction.¹⁰⁾

On 19 August 1945, the Japanese Government sent a mission of 16 delegates headed by Lt. Gen. Kawabe Torashiro to Manila. They were to open talks with the newly designated Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)'s staff. This was four days after the formal declaration of acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation.

The SCAP staff handed to the Japanese delegation surrender documents, among which was General Order No. 1. Article II directed the Japanese government to submit lists of all Japanese military units and vessels, minefields, airfields, fortresses, and paragraph (g) asked for locations of all camps and places of detention of UN Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.¹¹⁾ As specified further in Art. IX, Japanese authorities would guarantee safety and continuous supply of food, shelter, clothing and medical care until taken over by SCAP, the Japanese would hand over the control of camps to the senior officer among the internees, and the government would transport internees to places where it could hand them over to the Allies. In Directive No. 2, later designated as SCAPIN 2, SCAP prepared a message, which the Japanese would deliver directly to all POWs and Civilian Internees.

The two documents provided the basis on which the Japanese government would inform and support the incoming Allied troops in their recovery and processing mission. The cooperation of the Japanese government was thus indispensable.

4. Recovery of Imprisoned Allies

The U.S. occupation Army started to act immediately upon arrival. Their movement combined the two approaches above. They had to rely on the Japanese government information handed to them in the Philippines and further amended over the telegraph. They also relied on the Japanese government to continuously safeguard and supply POW and CI internment camps until the camps were liberated. At the same time, the Allies made reconnaissance to find other camps not mentioned by the Japanese. They made contact with long waiting prisoners, providing them with emergency information and supplies. Their operations boiled down to three categories: reconnaissance and emergency aid, reception and processing, and transportation and repatriation.

The first operation was reconnaissance and provision of emergency supplies. Its aim was to confirm the location of all Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee camps. This included sending them food and other necessities. As the Occupation Army had not yet established itself in Japan, the task fell primarily on the shoulders of the Far Eastern Air Forces. Originally, the planning by the Twentieth Air Force counted upon provision of supplies from Marianas. As parachutes and other cargo were lacking, additional supplies would come from Okinawa. They were combined with stocks from the Philippines intended for the military invasion of Japan in November.¹²⁾

The Twentieth Air Force, previously assigned with strategic bombing missions, was now in charge of storming Japan with food for the POWs. Reports from Japanese government show that these supply missions were not flawless. They killed or injured Japanese or Allied personnel due to wrong dropping or erroneous packaging.¹³⁾ The navy was also eager to carry out its

role. The Third U.S. Fleet under the command of Admiral Halsey arrived in Tokyo Bay area on 21 August. It immediately established waterfront camps accepting arriving POWs. On 29 August Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Ocean Areas, authorized Halsey to make surveys and evacuate POW camps in Shinagawa, Omori and Ofuna.¹⁴⁾

Most of the work, however, would fall under the Army in the Pacific. The Eighth Army supervised the evacuation effort from eastern Japan. It used Kisarazu and Atsugi Airfields to transport urgent cases to Okinawa and Philippines. The Yokohama Port also started preliminary reception and processing operations on 2 September.¹⁵⁾ The Sixth Army was responsible for operations in western Japan. It designated Wakayama and Nagasaki as the ports of embarkation. This is where recovered personnel would be loaded on ships bound for Okinawa and the Philippines. Kochi, Omuta, Kitakyushu (Kaiwan), as well as Hakodate and Sendai followed.¹⁶⁾ Each port was provided with 2 hospital ships, 4 APAs (Attack Transport – Auxiliary, Personnel, Attack ship), 2 aircraft carriers, and 1 LST (Landing Ship, Tank). U.S. and Canadian sick personnel were transported by air to Marianas and then to the United States directly. Sick personnel of other Allied countries were destined to Manila first.¹⁷⁾ The Tenth Army in Okinawa equipped many recovery teams for the mission falling under the Sixth Army.

According to the AFPAC Plan, the evacuation operation in western Japan would start from 13 September. This was two weeks after the surrender, consequent to landing and seizing occupation control. Early evacuation of recovered personnel proceeded first to Okinawa by ship and then to Manila or Guam by air.¹⁸⁾ Such operations allowed for quick evacuation by making use of short-range vessels, while reducing delays due to bad weather or long distances. The Eighth Army, Sixth Army and Fifth Fleet supervised all

operations.

Overall supervision and coordination of recovery efforts was in the hands of AFPAC Advanced Headquarters, Adjutant General Section. It created the Recovered Personnel Division for this purpose and appointed Colonel Griffin in charge. The duties of the Recovered Personnel Division were to administer information on Allied POWs as required by the Missing Persons Act. Those duties expanded with supervision of training and operations of recovery and processing teams at the time of surrender and occupation.

The situation for location and relief operations was very different in China. The agency responsible for recovery of POWs was neither the Army nor the Navy. It was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the organizational precursor of today's CIA. As Maochun Yu states, the OSS was a new agency charged with the role of unification of intelligence services. It however faced determined opposition in the field in European and Pacific Theaters of Operations. Only in China, because of a confused state of affairs, overlapping responsibilities and Chinese rivalries, OSS thrived (1996, 21; Clemens 1998). Strategic Services in the China Theater, had personnel trained for covert missions. They were used for being parachuted behind the enemy's lines where they would carry out their covert missions. At the end of the war, OSS formed contact teams, which would be dropped by the Air Ground Air Service of the U.S. Army Air Forces, China Theater, to major Chinese locations such as Beijing, Weicheng, Shanghai, Mukden, Harbin, Hainan Island, Keijo in Korea and Vientiane in Laos. They would locate POW and CI camps, render immediate aid, prepare accurate lists, coordinate airdrops of supplies and report to the headquarters. The OSS also gathered information about the local military conditions, including Soviet and Communist activities (Spector 2007, 10). Such contact teams were formed from about six persons each, and they were armed only with pistols. The teams

departed on August 15 and 16 to their destinations into the nests of Japanese and advancing Soviet forces.

As Ronald Spector portrays, OSS faced many challenges from both Japanese and Soviets. They employed improvisation and speedy action rather than detailed planning, which were the keys to their success (2007, 21). VIPs, such as General Wainwright or Lieutenant General Percival were transported to Xian by trucks or rail. From there they flew to Tokyo to join the surrender ceremony. Most of other POWs were left waiting. In many cases parallel to many places in Japan, they aimlessly wandered around the city or traveled to sightseeing resorts (Kumamoto Police 1986, 29; Nagasaki Police 1979, 1023; Fukuoka Police 1980, 512; Weller and Weller 2006, IIV-IIIIV).

It was only in early September that much larger processing teams arrived. They dispatched waiting POWs to Okinawa and the Philippines for further treatment, recuperation and disposition (Robbins 2011, 359; Roland 2001, 323; Scheipers 2010, 150; Saylor 2007; Riconda 2003, 218). Even in China and other countries, Allied recovery efforts would not be speedily carried out without the information and support provided by the Japanese.

5. Processing and Disposition

How did the evacuation mission look like at the receiving end in Okinawa and the Philippines? The Tenth Army on Okinawa provided the first evacuation facilities, but these soon proved inadequate. By 7 September, the processing on Okinawa already cared for 2,458 internees. Their total capacity of 5,000 spaces was full 3 days later, on 10 September. Commanders Stilwell and Richardson requested urgent diversion of evacuation from Okinawa to Saipan and other areas.¹⁹⁾ The AFPAC thereafter rearranged emergency transports.

It created a system where both capacities in Japan and overflowing facilities on Okinawa were under permanent control and revision.

Air transportation also did not go as smooth as originally presumed. Far Eastern Air Forces (FEAF) first promised transportation of 2,000 internees a day by air from Okinawa to Luzon. This was later downgraded to 1,000 because of impracticability in utilization of Clark Field and Florida Blanca. FEAF further decreased the numbers to 600. At that time, AFPAC partially diverted some transports, which were shipping occupation forces to Japan. The transports from Philippines were fully loaded on their way to Japan, but they were almost empty on the way back. The intent of the AFPAC directive was to provide lift to the POWs from Okinawa as well as Yokohama and other ports in Japan on their way to the processing centers in the Philippines.²⁰⁾ Speed was the utmost priority at first. This changed, however, when liberated Allied POWs and Civilian Internees crowded at the temporary disposition centers in Japan and Okinawa. The pace of their repatriation slowed down. Processing and interrogation of recovered POWs was also lagging in procedural clarity at first. Many American and Canadian POWs repatriated through Marianas without properly processed records.²¹⁾

The original plan set 20 September 1945 as the target date to end POW and CI recovery operations. It assumed that most evacuations of former POWs would be over by the end of October. Okinawa, however, was hit on 9 to 10 October by a vigorous typhoon. It destroyed both harbor and airfield facilities. This rendered Okinawan disposition centers and hospitals incapable of accepting any new incoming ships or airplanes with RAMPs, including urgent medical cases.²²⁾

The Philippines and Okinawa provided the backbone of support for AFPAC forces in Japan. Since April 1945, General MacArthur reorganized

his command in anticipation of preparations for the invasion of the Japanese homeland islands in November. The Philippines and Okinawa would provide logistical support and staging areas for the invasion. In fact, Okinawa was in a desolate condition after the recent battle. It served more as a temporary transit point rather than as a reserve and supply base for the 2.5 million Army under AFPAC. To concentrate on operational matters, MacArthur separated the control over both Philippines and Okinawa from AFPAC. He classified them as rear or staging areas. He then placed them under the command of the Army Forces Western Pacific (AFWESPAC), previously known as his Supply Command.

In accordance with the new institutional setup, the organization for processing of Recovered POWs also changed. AFPAC designated the Philippines as the primary destination for recovered personnel and civilian internees. Upon arrival, it transferred the jurisdiction over them to AFWESPAC. In AFWESPAC, the Replacement Command took over the mission of receiving, processing, billeting, care and recreation of recovered personnel. The Replacement Command established a central registration file and communications centers for interviewing and registering recovered personnel and civilian internees. It served as contact point for foreign missions (especially British, Australian Canadian and Dutch). The Replacement Command also became a temporary processing and housing facility for foreign recovered personnel and civilian internees. Hospitals provided capacities of 5,000 beds in Manila and 2,000 beds in the Luzon area. Billeting facilities provided spaces for processing of 45,000 persons. The total number of recoverees processed in the Philippines were 31,617 and 2,676 hospitalizations for September and October. Thus, reception facilities proved more than adequate.²³⁾

The implementation of Allied POWs and CIs recovery, processing and disposition was highly appraised. The new occupation militaries exercised the operation with promptness and accuracy. We will see in the next section, however, that not all was as smooth with the implementation.

6. Linkage to Demobilization and Repatriation

Recovery of the Allied POWs stationed in Japan and its overseas territories, was close to termination one month after its start. By the end of September 1945, however, it hit a new set of problems. Recovery, recuperation and processing were followed with the final stage, repatriation. There, they encountered complications. Apart from urgent medical cases transported directly to the USA, RAMPs assembled in the Philippines were waiting for return to their homes.

The policy directive on the final disposition and repatriation of recovered personnel arrived from JCS on 10 September 1945. It announced US official policy on repatriation of Allied RAMPs in the Far East. Besides sick and wounded, the directive prohibited any arbitrary assignment of priorities or discrimination. Everyone was treated equally regardless of status (POWs or CIs), nationality, military service, category of employment (military or civilian merchant marines), or position (officers or enlisted men).²⁴⁾ Equal treatment applied also to the recoverees of different nationalities.

What complicated repatriation of RAMPs were two happenings, which accounted for the delays in RAMPs' final trip home. One was the decision to speed up repatriation of thousands of Allied active military personnel, who were no longer necessary in the Pacific. The second was the initiation of planning for the repatriation of foreign nationals from Japan, and Japanese

nationals back home from the overseas territories. These were the two policies, which reversed the policy cycle of repatriation.

The first complication was about the demobilization and repatriation policy recently announced by the War Department in Washington (Compel 2016, 73). Most officers and enlisted men in AFPAC had stayed in the overseas military service for a long time. Many were eligible for early separation. The Washington policy on demobilization was augmented by MacArthur's 17 September announcement of small occupation force and commitment to speedy demobilization, which went far beyond what Washington was contemplating at the time. This complicated the problem especially for those RAMPs who had stayed under the Replacement Command in Okinawa and the Philippines longer than expected. A decision about speedy demobilization put pressure on reception centers and transportation shipping. It slowed down both the speed of processing former POWs and that of processing military personnel destined for demobilization (Compel 2017, 119). MacArthur's decision to speed up the demobilization process coincided with RAMPs' repatriation. The repatriation cycle started with implementation (RAMPs' recovery and repatriation), and now it was followed by a policy decision (demobilization and repatriation of Allied military personnel).

The second complication was about the treatment of Korean and Chinese nationals in Japan. There was some ambiguity in their recognition as "liberated peoples". Were they supposed to receive the treatment of enemies or that of allies? The problems of the treatment and repatriation of Koreans, Chinese, Formosans, and other people not considered Japanese, became a hard chestnut to crack. Progressively it included the former inhabitants of the Japanese Mandated Islands and of Ryukyus. At the time of the end of hostilities, the Allies were not determined about the treatment of the multitude of people,

which did not fit into the category of “Japanese nationals”.

MacArthur’s staff had to make up their mind only after the beginning of the occupation. Korean, Chinese and other peoples, most of whom faced repression and dislocation during the prewar and wartime, gathered in port cities in expectation of early return to their homeland. The policy for their repatriation was drafted in response to what was happening on the ground. Thus the Allies started planning for repatriation of “non-Japanese” only later, after the start of the occupation (Compel 2008, 117). Repatriation of “non-Japanese” out of Japan was accompanied with repatriation of Japanese nationals back home. At first, all responsibilities in relation to its nationals were with the Japanese government, but as population pressures rose and Japanese shipping stagnated, the Allies became progressively involved with repatriation of Japanese overseas military and civilian personnel back home. This culminated in December 1945, when the U.S. Congress committed over 100 Liberty ships and over 100 LSTs for the purpose of speedy repatriation of Japanese and non-Japanese peoples²⁵ .

The repatriation cycle was initiated with the implementation of RAMPs’ recovery, was transformed by MacArthur’s decision for speedy demobilization, and only after those two stages did the cycle finally arrive at policy planning for mass repatriation. The results of such planning impacted much of the first two years of the U.S. occupation of Japan, and the mass repatriation program transformed the demographic map of East Asia to almost an extent that the war did beforehand. That is a story, which extends beyond the framework of this article.

7. Conclusion

David Easton's framework for policy system analysis has provided a formal model to analyze not only political systems, but also political processes. Easton or Lasswell aimed at an objective science by separating and identifying the stages of input, decision and output. It would give us some universal knowledge about the political world around us. The problem with their approaches is that they make some fundamental assumptions about policy and politics. These are less tenable.

Concerning the case above, analysis of initiation of a policy process starts with asking a question about what that policy is. If we understand a policy as a stream from planning, through selection and decision, to implementation, what happens when some plans are vague, or not applicable to the situation at hand? How do we classify policies, which in themselves are bundles of other policies? Can we still apply the model in the same way?

Paul Pierson would disagree. In his article on policy feedback, he argues that, "effects become causes". Pierson's argument is that, looking at a policy only from the position of politicians as elite decision-makers is erroneous. One has to go beyond the micro-level causal principal-agency models. The observer must likewise look at the impact that policies have on citizens and mass publics. This necessarily includes the way institutions shape beliefs and capacities of stakeholders. Pierson bundles this argument in a wider claim, which reverses the cause-effect relationship, set out by Easton or Lasswell above. He claims that once the political dynamics is set in motion, earlier policy outcomes play a causal role in promoting new policies.

Edward Page further developed these propositions. As mentioned in the introduction, Page reaffirms the position of intentional policy process. He

however goes beyond the intentionality and focuses on action. Page recognizes two kinds of actions: measures and policies without agenda. Measures are what Wildavsky calls implementation, when policies create their own causes. That is, policies create unanticipated problems, risks and crises, which call for solution by other policies. The second type of action are policies without agenda. It means that elite decision makers have never really decided upon these policies. Thus, they are policies of non-decision (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963). These may be issues intentionally kept away from agenda or issues where there is almost no deliberative decision making process. Bureaucrats may therefore exercise control over the running of the policy (Smith and Larimer 2009, 179; deLeon and deLeon 2002, 467; deLeon 1997).

Building upon the above insights, this paper deals with policy initiation in two ways. Firstly, it looked at recovery and repatriation of Allied POWs and Civilian Internees as a case of policy with little planning and much stress on implementation. Secondly, it considered this action as the first in the chain of measures, which we might call the policy of repatriation during the early postwar period. The repatriation policy, therefore, started with implementation, it followed with decision, and only then, the actual planning for repatriation started. Contrary to the assumptions of Easton's or Lasswell's models, a policy may start from implementation and through the chain of feedback loops in the form of bureaucratic practices, or material conditions such as means of transportation, it may end in policy formulation.²⁶⁾

Endnotes

- 1) Michael Haas differentiates between systems analysis and policy process (decision making) analysis and assigns more importance to the former (2017, 157). As Karl Deutsch

emphasized, however, both system analysis and policy process analysis have many things in common. They rely on communication processes. Both define inputs and outputs in their models and both are primarily concerned with self-regulated process and overall balance of the system. To address the way, how systems and processes manage to retain their dynamic stability, Deutsch and others including Easton or Lasswell introduce the concept of feedback loops. Feedback loops are, however, a treacherous ground. They are constructed with emphasis on positive feedback and learning opportunity and thus with effects in mind which stabilize the policy process or the political system (Deutsch 1966, 192).

- 2) Lasswell himself attributes the development of the concept to Myres S. McDougal (1952, 915-946) and Korkunov (1922, 358).
- 3) The discussion about the relationship between policy outcomes and policy origination is the main objective of this paper. However, since the focus here is on a peculiar type of policy origination, the wider discussion of policy feedback will be considered elsewhere. Let us emphasize here that neither Easton, nor Lasswell, Deutsch, nor others have elaborated sufficiently enough on the complicated nature of feedback. Nor is there any mention that feedback itself could become a separate policy process. That is, that the policy process could be reversed and go backwards, from implementation to origination. The fact that a policy process could start from the output (or policy implementation) and end with input (or policy formulation) is contrary to the logic of their systems. The reasoning would violate the conceptual foundations of structural-functional models. The concept of feedback loop was a useful tool to address irregularities, but it was not considered in its full depth.
- 4) For more about ontological issues in political process see Hay (2002; 2006), Dryzek (2000, 2006) or Pettit (1993).
- 5) The two basic directives for the occupation associated with repatriation to some extent were: (1) Potsdam Proclamation, which promised Japanese soldiers early return home, but neither General Order No. 1 nor basic postwar policy guidelines were much concerned with the policy. (2) Operations Instructions No. 4, on the other hand, was a major outline for the MacArthur's military to execute the actual occupation of Japan. Extending hundreds of pages in length, the instructions, mentioned physical distribution of forces, their supply lines, communications, intelligence, military government, and other matters. Only the final part of instructions, Annex 12 focused on repatriation explicitly.
- 6) (1) GHQ AFPAC, Annex No. 10, 11 and 12, Operations Instructions No. 4, 27 August

- and 31 August 1945 respectively; (2) SCAP, General Order No. 1, also as W 48672, 130756 (Amakawa 1993, I-11, 240-249) 13 August 1945 and JCS 1467/2, 15 August 1945 (Responsibility for surrender of Japanese Armed Forces, I (a-g)); (3) SWNCC 58/9, 10 September 1945, "Statement of Policy on Disarmament, Demobilization and Disposition of Enemy Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War" part II3 (Disarmament) and III (Demobilization and Repatriation); (4) JCS 1380/15, 8 November 1945, "Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper", I 6a (Demilitarization, Disarmament) and I8 (Prisoners of War, United Nations Nationals, Neutrals and Other Persons).
- 7) For full definition see "Blacklist Operations: basic plan, care and evacuation of Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees", 4-C-28, microform (Iokibe 1987).
 - 8) Appendix 1 to Annex 5f, *ibid*.
 - 9) ZAX 5142, ZA 5143, 6 September 1945, AG (D) 03594, microform, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library of Japan (NDLJ-K).
 - 10) HQ 20 Air Force, TAC Mission Report, Mission No. POW, 20 Sep 45; also cited in MacArthur and Johnson (1966, 97, 104).
 - 11) W 48672 (Amakawa 1993, I-11, 240-249), 13 August 1945, also on microform, TS 00076, NDLJ-K; General Order No. 1 was also enclosed to SCAP Directive No. 1, later known as SCAPIN No. 1, officially issued on 2 September 1945.
 - 12) HQ 20 Air Force, TAC Mission Report, Mission No. POW, 27 Aug-20 Sep 45; also cited in MacArthur and Johnson (1966, 94).
 - 13) For example radio NR 76, Japanese Government to SCAP, 30 August 1945, 383.6 SCAP, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, General Correspondence, 1942-46, RG 496 AFPAC, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration II, (NARA II), informs that 9 Japanese were killed by airdrops in Hokkaido, and 3 Japanese in Shimo-Ochiai in Tokyo, both on 28 August 1945.
 - 14) The last two camps, and especially Ofuna, interned reluctant prisoners and aviators from bombardment raids without keeping registration or record. MacArthur and Johnson (1966, 100). Ofuna camp was especially notorious for cruelties on the internees, which were in early September made public in a long report by the Secretary of State Byrnes and published in the Japanese press. *Asahi Shinbun*, 8 September 1945.
 - 15) Ltr, EIGHTH Army, AG 370.05 (D), 2 September 1945, AG (A) 00280, microform, NDLJ-K.
 - 16) Rad 030730/Z, GUAM to CINAFPAC, 3 Sep 45. G-3 GHQ Adm 383.6/1, also cited in

- Arthur and Johnson (1966, 109).
- 17) Ltr., BNLOSCAP, 13 September 1945, AG (A) 00280; 180211Z, 18 September 1945, AG (A) 00279, both microforms, NDLJ-K. On 22 September, the Commander of the British Pacific Fleet, Frazer reported the need for transportation from Philippines of about 10,000 British recovered personnel to UK, 2,500 personnel to Australia, 7,000 Dutch personnel to Java, 800 Canadians and 1,000 other foreigners. 200115Z, AG (A) 00280, microform, NDLJ-K.
 - 18) ZA 5144, 6 September 1945; 090600Z, 9 September, AG (D) 03594, microform, NDLJ-K.
 - 19) NRDY 83015 JO, 101612, 10 September 1945, AG (D) 03594, and RJ 69842, 7 September 1945, AG(D) 03593, both microforms, NDLJ-K.
 - 20) CAZ 51869, 111117Z, 11 September, AG(D) 03593, microform, NDLJ-K.
 - 21) Z 1539, 15 September 45, AG(D) 03592, microform, NDLJ-K.
 - 22) 121327Z, 12 October 1945, AG(D) 03599, microform, NDLJ-K.
 - 23) Semi-Annual Report, 1 Jun-31 Dec 1945, AFWESPAC, p8, Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, RG 319, NARA II.
 - 24) WX 16434, 10 September 1945, AG(D) 03593, microform, NDLJ-K.
 - 25) 281442Z. CINCPAC-POA PEARL, 29 September 1945, and ZAX-6114, 26 September 1945, ESS(C)00632, microform, NDLJ-K.
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