Civil Effects of Operational Boundaries in Wartime and Postwar Okinawa

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Abstract

Since the rise of the modern territorial nation-state, countries have increasingly relied on negotiations and treaties to resolve their disputes. They have also provided plentiful justifications to vindicate the rightfulness of once-established boundaries. Such civilian boundaries tend to be permanent, legitimate, and little challenged from outside or from below.

During the time of armed conflict, however, many military operational boundaries are drawn apart from the existing civilian territorial arrangements. They tend to be temporary, volatile, non-negotiated, and their only objective is to serve the implementation of current military operations. Military boundaries are arbitrary, follow simple military rationality, and rarely respect historically established borders from before the war.

This paper focuses on the dynamics of boundary drawing during and after the WWII. It concentrates on the way operational boundaries were drawn for the purpose of execution of military operations in the Pacific, and on the way

those boundaries affected local civilian populations after the end of the war. Further, it analyzes the process of the establishment of boundaries based on the logic of military operations, the process of their alteration out of immediate military expedience after the end of hostilities, and the impact such changes left on the population and its economic, political, social and cultural life.

The conclusion of this research is that settlements of military conflicts often result in clarification of territorial arrangements, but also, that military boundaries tend to aggravate dissatisfaction of local populations when they are arbitrary and do not follow long-established civilian lines of governance.

1 Introduction

As a resolution of conflicts, many countries have increasingly relied on negotiations and treaties to resolve their disputes. They have also provided plentiful justifications for once established boundaries and entrench those justifications in treaties to vindicate their rightfulness (Coakley 2017, Moore and Buchanan 2003). Such civilian boundaries tend to be permanent, legitimate, and little challenged from outside or from below (Brown 2010). During the time of armed conflict, however, military boundaries are drawn apart from the existing civilian territorial arrangements. Military boundaries tend to be temporary, volatile, non-negotiated, and their only objective is to serve the implementation of current military operations. Furthermore, military boundaries are arbitrary, follow simple military rationality, and rarely respect historically established borders from before the war.

Borders are legal, but also social and political creations. Someone creates them and, once created, manages them in such a way as to serve the interests of those who put them in place. Borders are always initially created as a means

of separation, the construction of a barrier between two sides, normally as a means of perceived defense from outside influences, be it the invasions by foreign troops, or the unhindered movement of migrants. But boundaries may also become bridges for cultural and material exchange. Below, we will refer to two strands of theories that have dealt with boundaries.

The first strand has Hans Morgenthau among its foremost intellectuals. Morgenthau defined the role of territoriality in the following way:

> The modem system of international law is the result of the great political transformation that marked the transition from the Middle Ages to the modem period of history. It can be summed up as the transformation of the feudal system into the territorial state. The main characteristic of the latter, distinguishing it from its predecessor, was the assumption by the government of the supreme authority within the territory of the state. The monarch no longer shared authority with the feudal lords within the territory of which he had been in a large measure the nominal rather than the actual head. Nor did he share it with the Church, which throughout the Middle Ages had claimed in certain respects supreme authority within Christendom. When this transformation had been consummated in the sixteenth century, the political world consisted of a number of states that within their respective territories were, legally speaking, completely independent of each other, recognizing no secular authority above themselves. In one word, they were sovereign (Morgenthau 1985, 293–4).

The concept of territoriality and geo-strategic borders necessary for consolidation of power of a nation-state was extensively developed by prewar geopolitical thinkers like Ratzel, Maull, Haushofer, or Mackinder. Their concepts were based on geo-determinist ideas which drew upon organic theories of the

state, biological theories of racial struggle for survival, and Darwinian laws of natural selection. Territorial subjugation and maintenance of strong borders provided a rationale for imperial expansion and protection of the core state and purity of its superior race. In the notion of "Anthropo-geographie" they emphasized geographical determinism of development and excellence of races, as well as natural drive of cultures and states for imperial expansion as the best strategy for survival. Nazism and other authoritarian regimes adopted many of their ideas for cultural survival, struggle for domination, suppression of inferior cultures, geographic control and imperial domination, However, with the decisive defeats on the battlefield, many such concepts were discredited.

After the war, determinist theories gave way to functionalist and positivist analyses, which no longer emphasized the notion of imperialist struggle, but nevertheless, they continued to stress the importance of territoriality and borders as the means to the development and consolidation of the state. Hans Morgenthau emphasized the role of territoriality of the state and protection of its borders and realpolitik as the way to realize it. Richard Hartshorne focused on the importance of congruent boundaries of the state as functional means for state consolidation and negated the natural principle as insufficient and potentially centrifugal factor complicating the state capacity for survival (Hartshorne 1950, 105–107).

In the view of the first strand of theories on territoriality, national territories are determined by rationalist, objectivist, physical and ethnic criteria, and thus they are deemed to be naturally and historically given and static. Protection of such static character was vital for retention of national independence and sovereignty, and thus one of the important tasks for the states and their political systems. Borders were always associated with military, defense, sharp lines of delimitation, trenches, minefields, and measures

how to deter and stop enemy from infiltration, they were a security matter, and thus an issue of utmost national importance (Barnes and Farish 2006, 816–817). Among realists, many agree that national borders correspond to the natural extension of the nation-state. Where it is not so, and where injustice has been done to a nation curtailing its "natural rights" or population, it is a result of great power politics and not much can be done about it (Walt 2002). Strict principles of territorial non-expansion and non-intervention adopted into the international law after the first and second world wars restrict the operations of great power politics, but realists agree that such injustices have been done, and they have resulted in arbitrary boundaries (Brager 2004, Wagner 2004, Matray 2005, Husain 2014).

The second strand of theories has been diametrically opposed to the above realist, securitizing, objectivist, and naturalizing views. Researchers in this stream emphasize the social basis of state territoriality and borders. This was evidenced by their questioning of the essence of the immutability of national territoriality and national character (Nicol and Townsend-Gault 2005, Newman 1999, Diener and Hagen 2010, Ganster and Lorey 2005, Popescu 2012, Wastl-Walter 2011, Anderson 1996). Rather than doing military and security analyses, they relied on anthropology, philosophy, psychology, and cultural studies to trace the dividing lines between communities of those (Wilson and Hastings 1998, Sack 1986). For them, borders and territoriality were not associated with the natural sharp lines of delimitation, but rather with identities, social institutions, everyday practices, cultural rituals, and consent and legitimation of the population (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007, Arts et al. 2009). For anthropologist Frederik Barth, boundaries were not airtight spaces, but to the contrary, areas through which interaction and flow of people has always existed (Barth 1969, 33). To Barth such exchanges may lead to different

patterns of symbiosis between bordering groups without effects upon their cultural dividing lines, but they may affect individual identity change (1969, 132). For many others, however, border areas function as contact zones, providing opportunities for cultural hybridization, and grounds for the emerging transnational or post-national age (Glick-Schiller et al. 1995, Portes 1999, Lewitt 2001, Agnew 2009, Paasi 1998, 2008, Brown, 2010). Not all agree that this inevitably leads to cultural convergence and disappearance of boundaries, and some point at societal issues accompanying them, such as rising levels of immigration (Brubaker 2015, Ganster and Lorey 2005, Salehyan 2009).

From among the second strand, Wimmer asserts that there has been a trend to move away from naturalist, essentialist, primordialist or perennialist approaches on static statehood and territoriality, towards contested, constructed and contingent approaches, which focus on the dynamic process of boundary formation, sustenance, and change (Wimmer 2013, 2). At the same time, he moves beyond the two extremes, accepting that borders and identities are neither entirely fixed nor fully flexible (Wimmer 2013, 2018, O'Dowd 2010). They adopt a more pragmatic approach, which focuses on values, power, and practices embedded in their historical and regional framework. As a result, boundaries may mean both barriers and bridges, depending on the social practices, which constrain as well as empower actors to seek cooperation or raise walls (Wimmer 2013, 2018, O'Dowd 2010, Coakley 2003, 2017, Scott 2010, Kolers 2009).

With these discussions in mind, this paper will distinguish two kinds of boundaries and analyze the process of formation and change of a local frontier in the region of Nansei Shoto of Japan after WWII.

2　Military Operational Boundaries and Civil Territoriality

The above debates focus on many distinct boundaries and their internal or external aspects. Few, however, have discussed the phenomenon of military and civilian boundaries, which may often be associated with conflict and post-conflict resolution. During the time of armed conflict, military boundaries are often drawn apart from the civilian boundaries. Military boundaries are like imagined trenches in war. They tend to be temporary, volatile, non-negotiated, and their only objective is to serve the implementation of current military operations. Military boundaries are also arbitrary, follow simple military rationality, and rarely respect historically established civilian territorial borders from before the war.

There are two major types of military boundaries. One is the boundary which defines the frontline of operations against the enemy, and the other delimits an area of control by friendly commands and units. In linear warfare, where the line against the enemy and lines between friendly forces are well known and the battle is stabilized by having sufficient forces committed to defending the front, the differentiation between the two is possible. However, where warfare is not linear and there are several noncontiguous zones of operations, the boundaries between friendly units are nearly nonexistent and all borders signify the front with the enemy (U.S. Army 2001, 6–60).

Some contiguous area boundaries in joint military operations may reflect the functional separation between different military branches. Naval boundaries in maritime domain serve mainly the purposes of the Navy. These are drawn especially over water bodies such as lakes, seas, and oceans. But Navy's boundaries are not exclusively over water bodies, since Navy has also its harbors, airfields and other infrastructure over land. Similarly, for the

Land domain, not all of the operation zone boundaries are ascribed solely to the Army, and especially in joint operations, Army and Marine may engage in joint missions on land. Also, Army has its marine transport and air support functions which may have their operational zones and boundaries over water and marine bodies. Therefore, planning and execution of joint operations need special emphasis on collaboration and coordination, including adjustments of functional responsibilities and territorial areas of operations (U.S.J.C.S 2017b, IV-10; U.S.J.C.S 2019, II-7; U.S.J.C.S. 2021, IV-3).

Finally, operational area boundaries may reflect different purposes of relationships between commands. Most often the relations are of command control, however, organizational complexity and expediency in joint operations also calls for other kinds of control, which include operational control, tactical control, support authority, administrative control, coordinating authority, liaison and other command and control relationships. These relations have strong functional component, which complicate territorial control arrangements between various commands, and thus need careful coordination between those commands (U.S.J.C.S 2017a, V-2). When there are discrepancies among the planning staffs of the field commanders and coordination on the local level stalls, the issue may be resolved by communication between their higher echelon commands. Such inter-command arrangements may be set out in written contracts, and especially in international operations, they may be reflected in international agreements or treaties.

What all these various military areas and boundaries have in common is their flexibility and arbitrariness. To reflect the situation in the field, operation zones need to be flexible arrangements which amplify concentration of combat resources and commands. Such arrangements are not easy, since different commands, and especially the multinational ones, have their own *modus operandi*

and may regard any kind of coordination as intervention in their autonomy. Second feature of military areas is their arbitrariness. Theater or operational commanders need to plan carefully their area of operations, at which time they arrange boundaries between their subordinate commands. Many factors figure into the strategic and tactical area designs, including geographic, operational, personnel and intelligence elements. However, among those, considerations of civil administrative boundaries from before the conflict have relatively little weight, and operational necessities tend to prevail. Also, such boundaries may carry over into the peacetime arrangements of territorial control. In the next section, we will focus on the drafting and redrafting of military boundaries and their civilian impact in the Pacific Theater and especially in Okinawa.

3   Military Operations and Termination of WWII in Okinawa

One week after the Japanese surrender ceremony at the battleship Missouri which officially terminated the war in the Pacific, on September 7th, there was another ceremony in Okinawa, which would also terminate the same war in the Okinawan context. Surrender ceremony in Okinawa was much more solemn, and it received little attention around the world. Yet, the ceremony was consequential because it would shape Japanese future for the next 27 years, if not most of its "postwar" experience.

The reason for such an impact was, that the Surrender document signed by Japanese and American commanders included this wording:

"The undersigned Japanese Commanders, in conformity with the general surrender executed by the Imperial Japanese Government at Yokohama, on 2 September 1945, hereby formally render unconditional surrender of the islands in the Ryukyus within the following boundaries:

30° North 126° East, thence 24° North 122° East, thence

24° North 133° East, thence 29° North 131° East, thence

30° North 131° East, thence to point of origin.

This document drew an area surrounding the Ryukyus within which all Japanese commanders and troops would surrender to the U.S. Commander General Stillwell. It specifies nothing else, except for giving a term of reference for the termination of the war. Once the war was over, everything was supposed to return to the ordinary course. However, it did not, and the 30-degree boundary with homeland Japan would be carved into the minds of many.

Two explanations have been offered for the abrupt demarcation, one diplomatic, and one military. The first, diplomatic explanation belongs to Masahide Ota, who focused on the American long-term planning for the postwar occupation and settlement with Japan. Ota writes that Okinawa appeared in the State Department planning documents during the early stages of the war. The State Department started to make preparations for the postwar U.S. diplomacy early in the war, and it address the territorial settlement as one of the issues. It was there, where liberation of Korea was sought, and Ryukyus were addressed because they had been annexed by Japan only three decades prior to Korea (Iokibe 1987, 1-B-20, 1-B-3~4). Ota cites the "Masland Paper" of 2 July 1943, which discussed the postwar territorial settlement for Ryukyus, as the first policy paper where the 30° parallel has been inserted as the northernmost boundary of the Nansei Islands (Ota 1984, 388). His reason is that the military members on the Security Subcommittee were calling for detachment of islands south of the 30° North Latitude from Japan for security reasons (Iokibe 1987, 1-A-17; Notter 1987, 770-S-38). Ota links this drafting process to the Cairo Declaration, to calls for the application of the

UN Trusteeship System shortly after the war, and finally to the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan of 1952. His argument is all the more powerful, considering his linkage of Ryukyus to the American long-term strategic interests, as well as U.S. long term insistence on retaining bases in Okinawa. Ota's reasoning is persuasive, but it does have some weaknesses. Neither the Cairo Declaration, nor other planning papers talk about the 30° parallel. If the United States insisted on the separation, they should have been more consistent, and many later policy discussions within the State Department were negative about the territorial detachment.

The second explanation for the drawing of the 30° North Latitude boundary came from the military perspective. Seigen Miyazato focused on the U.S. strategic planning during the wartime, and especially on the weight of the plans for the postwar U.S. overseas bases (Miyazato 1981). These plans were initiated by President Roosevelt late in 1942, after the hard-won Allied victories in Midway and Guadalcanal, when he directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (below as JCS) to undertake studies for possible alternative intercontinental routes and locations for air facilities, which were supposed to station the Allied International Military Force after the war. The U.S. military planners made a thorough survey of islands and other locations on which to locate military facilities around the world, and especially in the Pacific. On 15 March 1943, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee advised that all islands "as far west as the Philippines, south of latitude 30° and north of the equator, should be neutralized or under U.S. control," and also that air and "naval bases should be maintained in Northeast China, or Korea, at least until Japan is accepted as a peaceful nation" (JCS 183/3, 15 March 1943, RG 218, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec.1). The discussions about overseas bases took on another turn when the international and commercial aspect was replaced with sole U.S. strategic interest. During

1944, the war continued and JCS made several other studies about which locations to seek for U.S. postwar bases. Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific were among them and the planners were determined to seek ways for their control or outright acquisition. Ryukyus were also listed among the places the military showed its interest in. However, Miyazato cautions, that just because the military created comprehensive lists of potential bases, it did not mean they were determined about acquiring them. In fact, until late 1944, the military was ambivalent (Miyazato 1981, 188–189).

Miyazato claims that the turning point came with the battle of Okinawa. Three days after the U.S. landed on Okinawan beaches, JCS sent MacArthur a directive to start preparations for the operations against Japan, and also that islands south of the 30° latitude were excluded from those operations. This meant that operations against Ryukyus were separated from those against Japan. The Navy took still further step and excluded all the islands below the 30° latitude from Japanese territories in its memorandums. The reason Miyazato gives for such a move is that JCS wanted MacArthur to focus on speedy base construction in the Ryukyus. JCS undertook overall revision of their postwar overseas bases requirements, and in the end, in October 1945, it upgraded the bases in the Ryukyus into the bases of primary strategic importance for the U.S. (Miyazato 1981, 192). There are weaknesses in this argument too. Firstly, if the U.S. was determined to keep Ryukyus, they should have included them in the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 as territories to be separated from Japan, similar to Taiwan or Korea. To Miyazato, the military was unable to make sufficient arrangements to persuade the State Department, which stayed opposed to such a deal. Also, while the 30° North parallel appeared in some policy papers, the way the U.S. related themselves to the Ryukyus was far from consistent and the policy papers on military bases

referred to the islands only by name, and did not describe them in detail as a geographical location. Miyazato also emphasizes that the major turning point on the U.S. base policy was in late October of 1945, but he fails to mention its relation to the surrender documents which were signed almost two months before.

Ota and Miyazato provide strong reasons about why the United States would be interested in separating Ryukyus from Japan and creating a very arbitrary boundary at 30° North Latitude. Ota focuses on U.S. civil agencies led by the State Department, which gave some considerations to raising the status of the Ryukyus in the postwar territorial settlement (Ota 1984, 389). Postwar territorial detachment of the Ryukyus would give the U.S. a leverage against other regional powers and rising communist menace. Miyazato avoids mentioning the drive for new territory among the U.S. motives, but provides evidence about the U.S. security interests which would explain the decision to retain the hold over the Ryukyus (Miyazato 2000, 22, 1981, 198).

This paper goes beyond the two explanations. To do that, we need to turn back into history and see what happened before and after the U.S. came ashore on Okinawan beaches. During the final stages of the Pacific war, the U.S. military planners were absorbed in thinking about the fastest way how to defeat Japan. The U.S.-led Allied effort concentrated on two courses of action. General MacArthur's "island hopping" campaign from the south through Solomons, New Guinea and the Philippines, and a sea route from the east by Admiral Nimitz via Midway, Gilberts, Marshalls, Micronesia, and Marianas. Despite U.S. military's commitment to inter-service cooperation, there was little overlap between the two commands when operations were far from Japan. Thus, MacArthur could carry his campaign "the Army way," and Nimitz his one "the Navy way." However, the closer the militaries got towards Japan, the

more it became apparent that some kind of arrangement was necessary about integrating their two commands and concentrating operations into a single battle zone.

Military planners in the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff developed their first plans for the final campaign against Japan in May 1943 (JCS 287/1, 8 May 1943, OPD ABC 381 Japan (8–27–42)), in which they favored a strategy to choose a port on the south China coast for air-bombing Japan. Such a port could bypass the troublesome China-Burma-India supply route, allow for the Allied control of the South China Sea, support Chinese Nationalist resistance, and enable intensive air-bombardment campaign of Japan. The JCS planners were for long thinking about capturing Taiwan and after that the Chinese coast. This was the ultimate "Navy way." The planners also considered MacArthur's "Army way" through southern, central, and northern Philippines too costly and time consuming (memo, King to Marshall, 8 February 1944, OPD ABC 384 Pacific (28 Jun 43)). However, in summer 1944 the balances changed and the Taiwan option started to lose favor among the planners. The Navy countered unsuccessful Taiwan-China combined plan, and then it changed the course and substituted Taiwan for smaller Okinawa. Okinawa was attractive because it was even closer to Japan, but also, because it would allow for both Macarthur's "Army way" in Luzon, and Nimitz's "Navy way" in Okinawa, which became the final decision on 3 October 1944 (Smith 1952, 17). The change from Taiwan to Okinawa also meant that Okinawa would not be the final battle, but rather the last battle before the one with Japan. Hence the codename name "Iceberg" selected for the Okinawa operations. JCS was long evading the decision about whether the final battle with Japan would be fought in the "Navy way" or the "Army way". The final decision, came on 3 April 1945 as mentioned above by Miyazato. MacArthur's plan "Olympic" was favored by JCS, also because it

reorganized the command relationships and gave Navy some say in the final assault. The 30° parallel was established only to distinguish the operation area under "Iceberg", and the one under "Olympic".

What were the consequences of dividing the final operations against Japan into two? The most important consequence was that the 30 ° parallel split Nimitz' and MacArthur's operational areas. This split was only a temporary arrangement because MacArthur's "Olympic" plan suggested that the two operation areas should be combined into one, headed by only one Supreme Commander, so that he is not hampered in the final war effort. It meant, also, that Okinawa would become a logistical supply area for the next battle, and thus it was combined with the Philippines under a separate logistical command. It still belonged to MacArthur, but the command structure was different from the one in Japan. In August, the purpose of the dividing line was making Okinawa a logistical area which would almost overnight turn the island into a huge military warehouse and an unsinkable air carrier with 24 planned airfields. As the battle of Okinawa was over, the only thing that mattered was construction, which would be dedicated to supplying the attack forces that were assembling for the operations against Japan. The dividing line at the 30 ° North Latitude was a reflection of neither Masland's construct severing Japanese sovereignty, nor Admiral King's desire for permanent anchorage, but a simple internal operational arrangement within the MacArthur's Command.

4　Transition of Military Boundaries

An abrupt change came with the Japanese surrender. Only ten days after MacArthur assumed his command over Okinawa, the Japanese government indicated its will to accept the Potsdam terms, and the war was over. However,

not many believed that the Japanese troops, which were spread all around the Pacific Ocean would actually seize fighting. The Allies thus devised a system of central-local surrenders among which MacArthur's was the most important ceremony, but not the only one. Okinawan commander General Joseph Stillwell was designated to accept Japanese surrender in Ryukyus. This meant that all Japanese commanders, who were dispersed around tens of islands within the "Iceberg" operational area, would have to sign the surrender document with Stillwell. Interestingly, all local surrender documents differed from each other because they reflected the local situation on the ground. What was special about the Ryukyuan surrender document were the geographic coordinates stipulated in the text. Other surrender documents, including the one in the Philippines or in Korea, do not list coordinates, even though Korea should have been doing so because of its infamous 38° parallel dividing the north and the south of the peninsula. The reason, which made the arrangement in Ryukyus stand out, lies probably as much in the structural explanations offered by Miyazato and Ota, as in the local interaction in the field.

What significant happened at the time of the two different surrenders? On 28 August, 4 days before the surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay, General Stillwell contacted all three remaining Japanese commanders in Ryukyus by radio to find out about their readiness to surrender. One was from the garrison Army in islands south of Okinawa, the other from the Army garrisoned at the islands north of Okinawa, and the third one was the commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy. All three commanders responded promptly. The situation changed, however, when the commander in the north, Lieutenant General Takada Toshisada was informed about the surrender area assigned to him, and the fact that he was required to surrender to General Stilwell in Ryukyus. He responded that he had to check with his superior command

and went silent. Takada's silence was very disturbing, and the tension at the Tenth Army Headquarters rose exponentially, because it was too close to the general surrender ceremony in Tokyo. On September 1st, General Stillwell was already in Tokyo to attend the grand ceremony, and in Okinawa, there was still no response coming from Amami Islands, where Takada was garrisoned. The silence from Amamis risked interfering with the surrender ceremony in Tokyo, and possibly might be used as a reason for reopening of the war. Finally, the response came on September 2nd not from Takada, but from the Imperial General Headquarters directly to the MacArthur's Headquarters, informing them that the commander in Amamis was ready to accept surrender in Ryukyus. Only after the communication between the two supreme headquarters, did the Tenth Army Command hear from Takada again.

Takada did have his reasons for brinkmanship. He was the native of Kagoshima Prefecture, to which Amamis belonged. He felt strong sense of responsibility, because his acceptance without an explicit directive from the Imperial Japanese Army might become a pretext for the U.S. territorial annexation of Amamis. In the memoirs he published in 1956, he wrote that he did not want Amami Islands to become another Alsace-Lorraine of the East (Takada 1956, 98). However, he could have figured out that the order for unconditional surrender only referred to the Japanese military, not all the population in Amamis. The surrender boundary which the Tenth Army communicated to Takada did not refer to a postwar territorial settlement, only to the military surrender. It was a military operational boundary. The fact that it invited such a violent reaction must have been surprising also to the Tenth Army, but they had no possibility of backing away. Backing from their requirements would mean that the U.S. is ready to accept a negotiated

surrender and would collapse the Potsdam agreement on the unconditional surrender. The risks ran high, and a catastrophe was overturned only at the last moment. The delayed negotiations for surrender in the Ryukyus were restarted after the surrender in Tokyo, and were an important reason why the ceremony in the Ryukyus was delayed almost for a week, and not signed the next day like in the Philippines. Furthermore, these complications were also probably the reason why Stilwell decided to insert topographic coordinates directly into the surrender document as shown in the last section above.

The surrender complications were the primary reason for the establishment of the military boundary at the 30° North Latitude parallel. What continued afterwards were the negotiations with Takada over disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of Japanese military personnel. These negotiations also met with some resistance from Takada, and the solution was settled when both the Japanese garrisons and Okinawan garrisons agreed on the 30° boundary as an objective point of delimitation. Other issues, such as repatriation, determination of nationality, or determination of electoral rights accounted for the extension of the military operational boundary into the civilian sphere. The same boundary later became the basis for the Peace Treaty negotiations.

5　Stabilization and Challenge of Civil Boundaries

The population in Okinawa and in Amamis did not accept the 30° boundary easily. The U.S. administration suffered from severe personnel shortages and policing the boundary between Japan and Okinawa seemed to be an almost impossible task. Dozens of islands scattered along vast distances between Taiwan, Okinawa and Japan, became known for illicit trade and

passage of people who were prohibited from visiting their relatives, pursuing higher education, returning to their homes, or procuring commodities in the homeland (Koike 2015, 240). The population was not willing to accept the arbitrary settlement easily.

The concern with migration started from the very beginning. As the hostilities ended with the surrender, the U.S. had to project their military government authority into the islands which were included in the Ryukyu operational area, but land operations on which were not carried out. As the war ceded and operational area turned simply into an administrative boundary between the Tenth Army and Sixth Army, the necessity arose to repatriate Japanese soldiers and others who claimed Japanese citizenship back to Japan. The same problem arose with the large population (about 100 thousand) of those who claimed to be from the Nansei Shoto area, and who, because of war labor mobilization or evacuation, were residing in the Japanese mainland. Mass demobilization and repatriation was over by late 1946, which was also the year when the occupation in both Japan and Okinawa became more stabilized (Fisch 1988, 95). This, however, did not result in a re-integration of the two regions separated by a defunct wartime operational boundary. To the contrary, despite rapidly dwindling resources, the U.S. military on Okinawa developed a new *raison d'etre*, reconsolidated its command, and established military government controls over the local population.

As a part of the measures to stabilize the postwar occupation controls were efforts to carry out a nearly complete separation from the mainland Japan. Ryukyuan occupation was carried out under the doctrine of wartime military government, where minimum controls would be delegated to the local governmental bodies. To the contrary, in Japan, the Supreme Allied Headquarters never instituted military government controls, and relied heavily

on the functioning Japanese government administration. Democratization in the Ryukyus was frozen down with the end of the war, and none of the elections, constitutional revision or sweeping legal, administrative, educational, or economic reforms taking place in whole Japan were carried out in Okinawa. Educational or economic reforms did take place, but their objective was the normalization of military controls, not return to the pre-war civil life. Okinawa has never been a self-sustaining zone, and thus, before the war it was dependent on many resources from the mainland Japan. With the population quartered and cities and industries erased with the devastating battle, the island became even more dependent on daily necessities. For four years, the military was supplying basic food and material provisions, which however were far from sufficient or fitting the demands of the population. Okinawa needed everything from food ingredients, medications, clothing, to essential building materials like nails (Ishihara 2000, 218).

Travel between Japan and Okinawa was prohibited, but the needs for daily resources were enormous. This was compounded by other necessities of life, such as the needs to communicate with friends and relatives, requirements for news, information, and cultural programs over radio from Japan and elsewhere, the demand for educational resources such as textbooks, teachers, and pathways to higher education. None of these was provided on the islands. U.S. military government was not ready to service the myriad of such demands, nor did it provide viable alternative to Japanese resources. The people were supposed to stick to the little of what they had. But many did not follow the occupant orders. Okinawan society and economy had been deeply integrated with that of southern Japan, and goods which were scarce in Okinawa would find their way through illicit networks of traders and individual trespassers. Sailing in small boats was dangerous, but the demand

was high, and today, many recollections of such "illicit" travel and trade form an indivisible part of the popular literature in Amami and Okinawa (Amami Kyodo Kenkyukai 1983, Satake 2003, Shiba 2011, Mikami 2013, Koike 2015). Overall, the variety of routes and reasons for going to the mainland or back, and richness of the personal stories behind them corroborate the illegitimacy of the wartime operational boundaries, and the depth of impact they had on the lives of ordinary citizens after the end of the war.

Over time, the U.S. was about to relax the military occupational measures. Not only because of rising global Cold War tensions, but also because of the domestic and international pressures for the termination of the extraordinary occupation regime and conclusion of a peace treaty. Cold War drew Japan and U.S. closer together, but also provided an argument for the U.S. to retain control over the bases on Okinawa. U.S. relaxed the ban on contacts with Japan and initiated a vigorous military construction program with the aid of Japanese companies and technicians. After nearly five years of hardship, the lives of Okinawan people begun slowly to enter on the path of turning to the pre-war levels. Also, the calls for the Peace Treaty were finally addressed, but its ultimate version reflected only the arrangement through which the United States reestablished the boundary between Amami and southern Japan. As seen in the discussion above, that what was a military operational boundary at the beginning, with few adjustments later, was inscribed into the international treaty, and with such an act, the separation between the two societies seemed like turning permanent. Despite such arrangements, however, voices denying any legitimacy to the boundary did not cease, paved the way to some changes in 1950s, and finally to its abolition in 1972 (Compel 2021, 42).

6 Conclusion

The military has always associated itself with state territoriality, borders, and geography. Since the times of Strabo and Ptolemy in medieval ages until the 19th century, maps had been considered so dangerous that they were locked and burned, and their creators and brokers imprisoned and executed. Even today, countries prohibit access to Google maps and erase or blur out places they deem sensitive. Yet, today's geography is no longer treated as heretic science, and geographers are no longer executed for their drawings and calculations (O'Leary, Lustick and Callaghy 2001). Geography's military interconnection has disappeared, and one can no longer find an entry on military geography even in a professional geographic dictionary. When Yves Lacoste, a famous French geographer expressed in 1970s that "geography serves, first and foremost, to wage war", he caused public uproar. In the 19th century, imperial expansion made military geographers a much sought-for profession, and the works of Mackinder and Ratzel contributed substantially to such a development. Rachel Woodward argues that the work of National Geographical Societies, or development and utilization of technologies of military geospatial systems have emerged out of this line of thought enhanced by the World Wars and the Cold War (Woodward 2009, 123). This traditional military research has treated geography as technical and descriptive science, and abounding with technical jargon, it has appealed to a few outside of the discipline.

On the other hand, the area of political geography has witnessed a renaissance during the past decades, associated with de-territorialization and the rise of the post-national and post-human. No longer is the "new geopolitics" concerned with technical descriptions, and often it has had little to do with

military or geographical science at all. To the contrary, the new trend has expanded the narrow perspective of geography and military science into the complex relationship between nature and society, thus including issues of psychology, identity, ethnicity, culture and their relationship to power and hegemony. New ontologies and epistemologies of boundaries, territoriality, and human existence were in waiting, and they focused not on maps, but on images, mental landscapes, memories, representation, identities, narratives, and discourses (Newman 1999, Rech et al. 2015, Elden 2009, Brown 2010, Ong 2006, Yamazaki 2010).

Within this emerging trend of research, David Newman has addressed re-territorialization, and forceful imposition of new military boundaries and their relation to mental dividing lines, ethnicity, and feelings of security and insecurity in conflict ridden Israel and Palestine (Newman 1999). Paasi has also addressed arbitrarily imposed boundaries between Russia and Finland, but he is much more optimistic about the possibility of changed meanings ascribed to them by societal narratives, and changing identities, which corresponded to such dividing lines (Paasi 1998). Furthermore, discussing the dynamics behind the UK-Irish territorial borders, O'Dowd is cautious about the de-territorialization discourse, but he remains optimistic about the possibility for cooperation (O'Dowd 2010).

The objective of this paper was to clarify the interaction and power dynamics behind the rise of the 30° North Latitude operational boundary, which separated one part of Japan from the other. It all started with badly drawn and poorly supported inter-command military boundary, and then, upon facing an unexpected challenge, it transmuted into a new civilian borderline between Japan and the Ryukyu Islands. The line was constantly challenged by cross-border "illicit" trade and migration to and from the "homeland". It also

changed over time between 30°, 29° and finally 27° North Latitude, at the free will of the "foreign mandatory power", depriving it of any residual legitimacy, until it was terminated in 1972 with the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. However, despite all the controversies that the boundary in Ryukyus had been associated with over time, it delimited the area of the Nansei Islands and attached a fictitious sense of legitimacy to it. The conclusion of this research is, therefore, that settlements of military conflicts often result in clarification of territorial arrangements, but also, that military frontiers tend to aggravate dissatisfaction of local populations when they are arbitrary and do not follow the long-established civilian boundaries.

7　Acknowledgments

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