Kyoto Univ, Kyoto, Japan
Yokohama Natl Univ, Yokohama, Kanagawa, Japan = 横浜国立大学
抄録
We present a model of incomplete information games, where each player is endowed with a set of priors. Upon arrival of private information, it is assumed that each player "updates" his set of priors to a set of posterior beliefs, and then evaluates his actions by the most pessimistic posterior beliefs. So each player's preferences may exhibit aversion to ambiguity or uncertainty. We define a couple of equilibrium concepts, establish existence results for them, and demonstrate by examples how players' views on uncertainty about the environment affect the strategic outcomes.
雑誌名
Japanese Economic Review
巻
56
号
3
ページ
332 - 351
発行年
2005-09
ISSN
13524739
DOI
info:doi/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00327.x
権利
The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.