Yale Univ, Cowles Fdn, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
Yokohama Natl Univ, Fac Econ, Yokohama, Kanagawa, Japan = 横浜国立大学経済学部
抄録
This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions. These sufficient conditions unify and generalize existing sufficient conditions. Our generalization of potential games is useful in other game theoretic problems where potential methods have been applied. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
雑誌名
Journal of Economic Theory
巻
124
号
1
ページ
45 - 78
発行年
2005-09
ISSN
00220531
DOI
info:doi/10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.009
権利
NOTICE: This is the author's version of a work accepted for publication by Elsevier. Changes resulting from the publishing process, including peer review, editing, corrections, structual formatting and other quality control mechanisms, may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been to this work since it was submitted for publication.
Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
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