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Dynamic communication mechanism design
http://hdl.handle.net/10131/00013910
http://hdl.handle.net/10131/00013910d04958a0-d1d4-42a7-a570-403bcc8340d9
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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Soc Choice Welf (2021).pdf (129.5 kB)
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Item type | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2021-06-02 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Dynamic communication mechanism design | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
資源タイプ | journal article | |||||
著者 |
Sano, Ryuji
× Sano, Ryuji |
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著者所属 | ||||||
Department of Economics, Yokohama National University | ||||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | We consider dynamic communication mechanisms in a quasi-linear environment with single-dimensional types. The mechanism designer gradually identifies agents’ valuations by iteratively offering prices to agents at different stages. Agents pay the maximum price they accepted if their desirable decision is made. We show that within weakly tight mechanisms, if a communication mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible, then it is a monotone-price mechanism. English auctions are characterized as a class of mechanisms that satisfy ex-post incentive compatibility and efficiency. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Soc Choice Welf. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01309-y | |||||
書誌情報 |
Social Choice and Welfare 巻 2021, 発行日 2021-03-03 |
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ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 1432217X | |||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11630877 | |||||
DOI | ||||||
関連タイプ | isVersionOf | |||||
識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
関連識別子 | info:doi/10.1007/s00355-021-01309-y | |||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
出版タイプ | AM | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | Springer | |||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
関連識別子 | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01309-y | |||||
関連名称 | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01309-y |