

Implementation of the Allied Policy on Demobilization of Occupation Troops from Japan and Okinawa

占領軍の動員解除はいかに実施されたか —政策実施における矛盾を中心に

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Abstract

The Allied occupation of Japan has stimulated a number of policy studies which draw on the Japanese experience generally from the perspective of policy planning. The occupation forces were mandated with policy implementation, and therefore, when analysts speak about occupation reforms, they generally refer to the successful implementation of Allied policies. This article draws on one concrete example of policy implementation in the area of early postwar demobilization of the occupation forces. It focuses on some problems and deficiencies in the implementation process of demobilization, and on two ways in which the implementation process transformed the original policy of demobilization.

1. Introduction

The generally perceived success of reforms by the U.S. General Headquarters during the period of the occupation of Japan has stimulated a number of policy studies which draw on the Japanese experience generally from the perspective of policy planning.¹⁾ The occupation forces were mandated with policy implementation, and therefore, when analysts speak about occupation reforms, they generally refer to successful implementation of Allied policies.

Policy implementation is one of the major areas of policy making. Harold D. Lasswell, post-war political scientist at Yale University, has generally been credited for developing the concept of policy cycle and including policy implementation as one stage within the cycle. In Lasswell's early categorization in 1956, policy implementation was separated into two stages of a seven stage policy process: invocation and application.²⁾ Over time, the two stages have

1) Janssens, Rudolf V. A. *"What Future for Japan?": U.S. Wartime Planning for the Postwar Era, 1942-1945*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995, p.445; Swensson, Eric H. F. "The Military Occupation of Japan: The First Years Planning Policy Formulation, and Reform." *Ph.D. Dissertation*. University of Denver, August 1966, p.28; Ward, Robert E. and Yoshikazu Sakamoto, eds. *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987, p.2; Schonberger, Howard B. *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952*. Kent State University Press, 1989, p.25; Iriye, Akira. *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981, p.150.

2) Lasswell, Harold D. and Abraham Kaplan. *Power and Society*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, p.197; Lasswell, Harold D. *The Decision Process*. College Park: University of Maryland, 1956, p.3. Lasswell himself attributes the development of the concept to Myres S. McDougal's article "The Comparative Study of Law: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order," *Yale Law Journal*, 61.6, (1952), p.915-946, and Korkunov's *General Theory of Law*, 2nd. ed. Macmillan, 1922, p.358.

been merged into one. Since Lasswell, the concept of implementation has been assigned to a variety of different categories, but generally it has been understood that it belongs to one of the four core areas of policy process (agenda setting, decision making, implementation, evaluation).³⁾ Notwithstanding its importance, implementation had not received much attention, and it was only in mid-1970s with the appearance of Pressman and Wildavsky's seminal work aptly titled *Implementation*, that the issue would be cast in light. Their reconsideration of the concept has been called "one of the most important conceptual innovations of policy research".⁴⁾ Pressman and Wildavsky's volume has been credited for clarifying the concept of implementation by tracing the reasons and consequences of policy implementation failure. Lack of a clear-cut definition and categorization of implementation has penetrated the concept and the volume had expanded upon its scope. For example in the eleventh chapter by Angela Browne and Aaron Wildavsky, the two mention that implementation is "no longer solely about getting what you once wanted but, instead, it is about what you have since learned to prefer until, of course,

3) Iwasaki, Masahiro. *Seisaku Katei no Riron Bunseki*. Tokyo: Miwa Shoseki, 2012, p.19; Yakushiji Yasuzo. *Kokyo Seisaku*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988, p.46; Akiyoshi, Tadao, et. al. *Kokyo Seisakugaku no Kiso*, 2nd. ed. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2015; Shiratori, Rei, ed. *Seisaku Kettei no Riron*. Tokai Daigaku Shuppankai, 1990; Adachi, Yukio. *Kokyo Seisakugaku to ha Nanika*. Tokyo: Minerva Shobo, 2009, p.46.

4) Pressman, Jeffrey and Aaron Wildavsky, eds. *Implementation*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. The quote refers to innovations in the 1970s and comes from Jann, Werner and Kai Wegrich. "Theories of the Policy Cycle," in Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney, eds. *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis*. Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis Group, 2007, p. 52.

you change your mind again.”⁵⁾ Wildavsky’s work questioned one of the basic assumptions of policy implementation, the understanding that it was one stage in the linear, rational, congruent, and efficient policy process starting with formulation and ending with termination as introduced by Lasswell. Later works in policy implementation further reviewed the limits of early studies.^{6) 7)}

The purpose of this article is not to discuss various theories of policy implementation in detail, but rather to build upon the experience of the occupation of Japan, within the framework of debates in policy studies. We will focus on the process of implementation of personnel demobilization of the Allied occupation forces in Japan. American occupation of Japan after the WWII has often been reviewed in terms of policy formulation.⁸⁾ The major reason for such a focus is that American the U.S. government, and especially the Department of State, had engaged in drafting occupation policies before the actual end of the war and start of the occupation, as well as the fact that such policy planning has been easily accessible to academic scrutiny in public

5) Browne, Angela and Aaron Wildavsky “Implementation as Exploration” in Pressman, Jeffrey and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, p.234.

6) Lipsky, Michael. *Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980; Goodin, Robert E. *Political Theory and Public Policy*, University of Chicago Press, 1982; deLeon, Peter “The Stages Approach to the Policy Process: What Has It Done? Where Is It Going?” in Paul A. Sabatier, ed. *Theories of the Policy Process*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999.

7) Yakushiji, Yasuzo. *Kokyo Seisaku*, University of Tokyo Press, 1988, p.44 ; Lerner, Daniel, and Harold D. Lasswell. *The Policy Sciences. Recent Developments in Scope and Method*. Edited by D. Lerner and Harold. D. Lasswell, Etc. Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1951, pp.vii-x.

8) For example, Iokibe, Makoto. *Beikoku no Nihon Senryo Seisaku*, vols. 1 and 2. Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1985.

archives. The real occupation policy has been easily accessible to academic scrutiny in public archives. The real occupation policymaking in Japan was, however, conducted within the framework of implementation and not of policy planning. The occupation forces, represented most symbolically by General MacArthur, did not have the mandate for policy decision-making.⁹⁾ Policy decisions were supposed to be done in New York (Far East Commission) and in Washington, D.C. (President, War Department). Implementation was what the General Headquarters (or the G.H.Q.) in Tokyo and its subordinate commands were responsible for.

Demobilization of Allied Forces, and especially American Ground Forces, is one among many policy issues during the early occupation period of Japan. Purely military matter, demobilization was handled by the War Department, which had been for three years drafting a detailed masterplan for the postwar demobilization of its military forces.¹⁰⁾ After three years of drafting, the department should have been well prepared by the end of the war, when the policy entered the implementation stage. Was the War Department ready for smooth implementation of its demobilization and move of redundant forces out of Japan? In this paper we argue that it was not, and that the process of implementation of demobilization faced two kinds of challenges which complicated a smooth and pre-planned transition of occupation forces, the first challenge from above, and the other from below.

9) Hellegers, Dale. *We the Japanese People*, Vol.1. Stanford University Press, 2003, xi.

10) The exception among the federal agencies were National Resources Planning Board and its successor the Office of War Mobilization, which developed plans on sustenance of full employment after the end of war, generally known as the G. I. Bill of Rights. Public Law 346, 78th Congress.

2. Challenges from Above

When the planning for demobilization started in 1942, its objective was to prevent dislocation and mismanagement which had followed disorderly demobilization after the First World War.¹¹⁾ In order to prevent dissatisfaction of the public associated with such dislocations, the Army designed point system of personnel demobilization. The system would put utmost emphasis upon every single soldier and assess his or her length of service, battle achievements, family background and other factors. The system rested on two principles, clarity and flexibility, but especially on one more principle, justice. Every soldier would receive certain number of points, which guaranteed clarity and justice, because everybody would know his or her points, and also the reasons for why they got those point. Flexibility and justice would be guaranteed by the fact that ceiling for releases would be announced as necessary, and the Army was left with discretion to determine the pace and number of personnel available for releases by simply increasing or decreasing the ceiling.¹²⁾

The point system was a hybrid structure, though, emphasizing individual values, but at the same time trying to uphold military efficiency. These two made strange bedfellows, because removing most experienced individuals would manifestly harm efficient operation of military units. The system was thus full of contradictions. While recognizing these contradictions, the Army had two reasons to stick to its hybrid design. The reasons were, the end of war in Europe, and expectations of public criticism at home.

11) March, Peyton C. *The Nation at War*. New York: Country Life Press, 1932, p.326.

12) Compel, Radomir. "Mo Hitotsu no Sengo Keikaku," *Yokohama Law Review*, 24:2-3 (2016.3): p.78.

First, the war in Europe was planned with a presumption that the war in the Pacific would end about one year after the victory in Europe. In 1944, there was no guarantee that the war in the Pacific would be over by the beginning of 1946. Allies were preparing for a lengthy war even after the victory in Europe. Military necessity would govern demobilization, assuring that many of the 70 divisions in Europe would get to the Pacific in the best possible condition to continue fighting. There was a need for experienced replacements in the standing divisions during the operations against Japan, and thus, many replacement units would arrive from the European theater. The War Department would permit only limited demobilization and it designed the point system to do justice to all U.S. soldiers across theaters, and also not to discriminate among those sent for replacement to the Pacific theater.

Second, the military recognized the pressures by the public opinion for rapid demobilization at the end of the war. From the outset of the war, the Army was well aware that any policy would have to take into consideration pressing demands of the public.¹³⁾ The point system was designed to do justice to individuals and, in that way, appease their discontent. The lessons from the First World War taught that the public was not easily convinced by “military necessity.”¹⁴⁾ They also taught, that the less dissatisfied the enlisted soldiers were, the easier it would be to convince the public about such postwar “military necessities.” The First World War events had only seen a simple form of

13) Sparrow, John C. *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army*. Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1952, p.34.

14) Sanders, Chauncey E., “Redeployment and Demobilization” in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. VII. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983, p.546–548; Sparrow, *op. cit.*, p.18.

demobilization, the one of separation by military unit. Prior to October 1918, the military had given no thought to post-conflict demobilization planning. Then on the Armistice Day, 11 November 1918, demobilization by unit was announced, and the Army was put under immense pressure by Congress to “Bring the boys home!” Separations appeared in a rapid rate of around half a million a month, reducing the Army from 3,6 million to 275,000 in a year. The rate and the method of separations was still not good enough for servicemen, their families and the Congress, which bombarded the War and Navy Departments with requests for justice and for faster demobilization.¹⁵⁾

Despite all the planning and justifications behind the point system in the Second World War, the Army failed to reach its foremost objective, the satisfaction of the general public. The policy of demobilization, so meticulously drafted in the planning stage was turned on its head during the implementation stage. The policy the military designed was not enough for the public. The more the public grew critical, the higher was the risk that the postwar troop deployments would be downscaled beyond expectations, and the more intense were the fears that there would be deep cuts in the postwar military budget. The public would not recognize military’s justifications on the ground of “military necessity” in time of peace. Not unexpectedly, the thorn in the eye of the public was the way justice was done to the demobilization releases.¹⁶⁾ There were three reasons which irritated the public. One was the

15) Sparrow, *op. cit.*, p.18.

16) AG 370.01, Case 2 (13 Jun 45), DRB, TAG, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD, cited in Sparrow, *op. cit.*, p.126; see also letter from and responses to Congressman John W. Vorys of 25 August 1945 and later, ABC 370.01 (10 Aug 44) Sec. 1-A, “American-British Conversations Correspondence Relating to Planning and Combat Operations,” 1940-1948, Record Group 165, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

weights in release, another one was the general military policy, and the last one was the nature of the draft system.

The first reason was about the flaws in the point release system. When the war ended 14 divisions out of 17 requested by MacArthur from Europe were in the United States on redeployment furlough. They were suddenly no longer required in the Pacific, but at the same time, many of their soldiers had not reached the point levels for automatic release. Treatment of such cases, as well as coping with the insufficiencies in shipping and processing facilities, exhibited that despite the point system, not entirely just treatment was attainable. Preferences had to be made. Injustices disturbed servicemen. Those dissatisfied with the solutions done through the point system, or through other temporary arrangements started to voice their opinions to their relatives and in letters to their Congressmen. At the outset, after the defeat of Germany, dissatisfaction was low and transfers to the Pacific were justified on apparent considerations of military necessity. Once the war in the Pacific ended, the announcement of the demobilization policy gave them the assurance of early return. However, in the two last weeks of August 1945, nothing much was done. The daily release of men was 4000 and the numbers did not appear to be growing as fast as the expectations. On the other hand, as the men working in separation centers became themselves eligible for separation, the work efficiency plunged while the demand for a speed-up grew.¹⁷⁾

All commands reported significant decline in morale of their men. Early in September, the AAF established its own separation bases and procedures, not only to retain autonomy from Army separation centers, but also to prevent the spread of overcrowding, dissatisfaction and confusion. Establishment of

17) Ballard, Jack Stokes. *The Shock of Peace*. Washington D.C.: UAP, 1993, p.85.

separate separation bases and change in its policy of retaining most officers enabled the Air Forces to demobilize its personnel speedily. The AAF terminated its mass demobilization in February 1946 with its forces quartered to about 500,000 from over 2 million by the end of the war.¹⁸⁾ Despite the achievements in reductions, the flaws in the point system made servicemen complain about unjust treatment. As critical ceilings moved downwards, utility of the point system decreased. Recently recruited men had neither been long enough in service, nor did they participate in battles, receive honors and dependency credits. The fact that points accumulation was terminated on the V-J Day made many soldiers ineligible for separation by margin of only several points, with no prospect for release. The point system, designed to do justice at the end of the war, had increasingly been blamed for doing the reverse.

The second reason for public discontent was general military policy after the end of the war. Concerned families directed their letters mainly to Congress, but also to the President and the military departments. Some letters were from industrial organizations such as railroads, coal mines and other professional groups, including movie actors, boxers, football and baseball players, that urged early releases for commercial reasons, but after the abortive lesson of the First World War, the military categorically disregarded needs in various sectors and removed such letters from consideration.¹⁹⁾ The military did not put much weight on the opinions of servicemen's wives and their clubs, except for adding the dependency credit into the point system formula. Wives responded with a deluge of baby shoes to Congressmen who were supposed to be more attentive than the military. Such calls raised the urge on Congress

18) Sanders, *op. cit.*, p.567-9.

19) Lee, R. Alton, "The Army "Mutiny" of 1946," *Journal of American History*, 56 (1966): p.558.

to act, and the more they were disregarded by the military as the substance for early releases, the louder was the criticism they raised. The flexibility of the War Department to respond to appeals from different pressure groups was limited by the overall troop deployment plans it had developed for the postwar establishment. Such plans were not coming out easily. Late provision of the final postwar manpower numbers had delayed the final planning for redeployment from Germany. After the surrender in the Pacific, the numbers for postwar troop deployments were two weeks late.²⁰⁾ The reason was not that defense personnel were slow in information processing, but rather that priorities for the overall postwar military policy were not precisely and firmly defined. Firm numbers for demobilization could only be specified after basic policies, such as Postwar Military Policy, Postwar Overall Strategic Plan, determination of shipping capabilities, overall occupation requirements in Europe and in Asia, and Postwar Military Base Requirements were established. But considerations of most of these plans were barely in their beginnings by the end of the war.²¹⁾ Firm decisions on demobilization lagged, military grew

20) JCS 521/19, 27 September 1945. In September the overall estimate for the Army was 1.95 million on 30 June 1946. 381 (02-08-43) Section 10, Central Decimal File 1946-47, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

21) JSC 1496, JCS 1518, JCS 570 series, records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. Most substantial but late guidelines were JCS 1478 and JCS 1482 in regard to the postwar requirements for military and naval forces, *ibid.* Basic policies are referred to in, e.g., Schnabel, James F. *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, vol. I. Delaware: Michael Glazier inc., 1979, p.140-145; Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, p.262; Stoller, Mark A. *Allies and Adversaries*, London: University of Carolina Press, 2000, p.153-155, 259-260, 306 n26; Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992, p.105-106. All of the authors present different (and quite deterministic) pictures of the postwar world, but none fails to notice that there was a period of "transition" after the end of conflict. Their insufficient treatment of "transition" lays behind such determinism.

assertive in vague calls for “military necessity,” and public grew restive that their men were not coming home.

Thirdly then, public criticism was not directed only at the injustices done by the point system or military planning, but at the nature of the military draft system per se. The Army and Navy built from the fall of 1940 was based on the principle of non-voluntary military service. Its legal foundation was the Selective Service Act²²⁾ which drafted servicemen by lottery, and not according to their will. The way civilians were mobilized into the Army and Navy corroborated the fact that servicemen would seek to leave the military as soon as possible after the end of hostilities. At first the Army was able to adjust itself by hedging. The Army supported a bill that was passed on 6th October 1945 as Public Law 190, which enabled recruitment of volunteers, and it was also expecting a soon passage of the Universal Military Training Bill. The fact that volunteers would replace demobilized personnel increased the speed of separations. On 3rd September the critical score for enlisted men was lowered to 80 points, and on 20th September the Army Chief of Staff Marshall announced in an informal meeting with Congressmen that the critical score would be further lowered to 70 on 1st October, and to 60 on 1st November.²³⁾ These numbers calmed waters for a while, but failed to satisfy Congress. The public was uneasy about military's hold on their deployments overseas. Once the war was over, soldiers were simply expected to come home. For them the world was safe from dangers and the United States safe from aggression again.

22) Burke-Wadsworth Act, 54 Stat. 885, 14 September 1940.

23) Senate Doc. No. 90, United States Congress, Senate. *Demobilization of the Armed Forces*. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate on S. 1355, 79th Cong., 1st and 2^d Sess., Part 1. Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1945, p.7-10.

The “No Boats - No Votes” slogan assured that Senate, facing elections in 1946, would not forget about transportation of their men from overseas and that it would revive the concept of “civilian control” over the military. Passing the Armed Forces Voluntary Recruitment Act, Congress had used it to support the arguments for early demobilization of non-volunteers. Criticism went so far, that some Congressmen urged that Congress gain control over the execution of the policy, and initiated a series of bills for demobilization.²⁴⁾ Republican Congressman D.A. Reed even introduced a bill for automatic releases, and when it failed to pass in the committee, he followed it with a petition to the Speaker of the House. But after all, the two military departments were left to design the policy, and Congress chose to apply pressure rather than assume responsibility for demobilization.²⁵⁾ Discussions in Congress reveal that Republicans criticized Army’s Demobilization Plan for its slowness and inefficiency with Democrats in support of it, while Democrats questioned the need for military presence overseas with Republicans exercising more caution.

In conclusion, no matter how perfectly the demobilization policy would be drafted, the principles it incorporated would raise concerns of the public. Dissatisfaction with a policy does not necessarily guarantee that such a policy would be automatically challenged. What happened in the case of demobilization was, that the issue reached the legislature, and with the 1946 elections looming, legislators threatened with destabilization of the Truman executive. Once decided at the level of the War Department, the policy would face serious challenge at the stage of implementation and from the very top of

24) H.R. 3909, 3917, 4010, 4340, 4423, 4434, 4467, 4498, 4514, 4511, 4515, 4518, 4532. *Congressional Record*, 79th Congress.

25) Sparrow, *op. cit.*, p.143.

the American administrative machinery, President and Congress.

3. Challenges from Below

Implementation of demobilization plans also ran across another set of difficulties. Those did not come from the governmental heights in Washington, but from the field, in the Pacific. Planning for demobilization in the Pacific Theater was from the beginning of 1945 a substantial problem if constant pressure was to be sustained against Japan. General MacArthur was very cautious about demobilization prior to the end of the war in the Pacific.²⁶⁾ Much uncertainty pertained to the success of the campaign in Kyushu undergoing preparations. Armed forces in the South West Pacific Area were continuously handicapped by shortage of personnel during the war. In the spring of 1945, armed forces in the South West Pacific Area were composed of 21 divisions with approximately 53 air groups, but they suffered heavy losses and all were in serious under-strength. The end of war in Europe brought partial demobilization into effect and made it possible for some units in Europe to be released for service elsewhere, especially in the Pacific. Then, suddenly, the war was interrupted with Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Implementation of Allied military personnel demobilization in Pacific was supposed to be smooth and neat. The point system was designed to satisfy all, and it was tested in Europe. What ensued, instead, was confusion, complications and policy reversals. There were two reasons for such

26) Radio from CINC AFPAC to WARCOS, C-23346, 5 July 1945, 370 R&D AFPAC, File 4, Adjutant General, General Correspondence, 1944-46, Record Group 496, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

confusion, overshooting of demobilization estimates, and underestimation of the expectations of soldiers waiting for demobilization.

Let's first look at the way how the plans for demobilization worked in the Pacific. In fact, demobilization in the Pacific started at the same time as in Europe. The standards for demobilization were applied equally around the globe, and thus also in the Pacific, which was engaged in the battle of Okinawa and in the midst of preparations for the final invasion of Japan.²⁷⁾ Demobilization, which in Europe relieved high point personnel, also reduced the most experienced personnel in the Far East. The immediate result of partial demobilization was, therefore, that it made the prosecution of war even more difficult for the understaffed Pacific Theater. In total, 2 million men were to be discharged, and the same measure meant that 300,000 men would be eligible for demobilization from MacArthur's command. Such a reduction would diminish about one quarter of his troops of approximately 1,400,000. MacArthur fervently opposed such reductions, and he was especially concerned with any further lowering of the point ceilings. In summer of 1945, the Army was contemplating taking the ceiling down from 85 points to 80. Most of MacArthur's troops were high point personnel, and such reductions would disintegrate his forces. The Sixth Army alone, assigned for the preparations for the landing operations "Olympic" on Kyushu in November 1945, would lose 23,000 enlisted men. MacArthur was desperate to keep his military untouched. However,

27) AFPAC estimates for release of high point personnel available for releases according to the readjustment regulations were around 20 thousand men for August, and each consecutive month in 1945, about one tenth of the numbers after the war ended. "Estimate of Individuals to be Returned to U.S.," AG 370 (25 Jul 45) AG-OR, 26 July 1945, 370 R&D AFPAC, File 4, Adjutant General, General Correspondence, 1944-46, Record Group 496, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

the end of war in Europe also promised reinforcements from there. In April, with the end of the campaign in the Philippines, MacArthur's headquarters of the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) were reconstituted to Armed Forces, Pacific (AFPAC). After the changes were effectuated, MacArthur asked for 17 divisions of redeployments from Europe. If MacArthur received all he asked for from Europe, and combined with combat and discharge losses, his forces would make up 36 divisions and 125 air groups. Most of the new units would arrive until the end of 1945, so that the Olympic offensive could be started in November. Armed Forces, Pacific were expecting to receive reinforcements of about 1 million men, to bring the total troop strength for invasion to 2,439,400.²⁸⁾ Then the abrupt termination of war came with Japan's acceptance of Potsdam Declaration. No invasion forces were necessary any more. Despite that, the redeployment machinery was in place, and reinforcements on their journey to the Pacific Theater. Some of them would flow in even after the end of hostilities in the Pacific, and some of the units were deployed for occupation duties in Japan.

When the collapse of Japan came in August, MacArthur was quick to act. Shortly after the surrender, he was asked by the Chief of Staff Marshall to submit final troop requirements for occupation duties. Other theaters in Europe and Middle East refused to significantly reduce their postwar force levels. By the end of the war the War Department was planning that about 370,000 men would stay in Europe, and 383,000 in the Pacific for occupation duties. This was considered the minimum to carry out the job.

However, on 17th September, General MacArthur said that a smooth

28) G-3 reports and summaries of JCS 521 ser., as in GHQ, FEC. *Reports of General MacArthur*, v.2. Washington D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 1966, p.394.

progress of the occupation of Japan made possible a drastic cut in the number of troops originally estimated.²⁹⁾

Within six months the occupational forces [for Japan], unless unseen factors arise, will probably number not more than 200,000 men, a size probably within the framework of our projected regular establishment and which will permit complete demobilization of citizen Pacific forces which fought so long and so nobly through to victory.”

This statement was not coordinated with Washington agencies and it caused uproar in Congress. War Department was criticized for lax attitude in demobilization, the Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson resigned the next day, and the statement also embarrassed the President, who just gave his approval of the War Department troop numbers.

The first reason for the postwar confusion in the implementation of the demobilization policy came from the field, from MacArthur and his staff. MacArthur overshot in his prognosis to keep the postwar levels of his occupational forces at the level of 200,000 men. It would earn him respect among his men, and popular credit at home. The number would mean that only about 4300 occupation troops would be available per one prefecture, including Tokyo, and other metropolises. In Washington, MacArthur’s public statement prompted the executive to cut down in its postwar plans. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall surprised Congressmen in a speech given three days later, on 20th September, with a promise of drastic point reductions and with a shocking announcement that “by late winter” the Army would discharge all men with

29) Sparrow, *op. cit.*, p.351; Lee, *op. cit.*, p.558; The New York Times, 18 September 1945, p.1.

two years' service.³⁰⁾ One week later, War Department's appropriations were to be slashed by Congress for more than 28.5 billion dollars.

The second reason for confusion came yet from another quarter. There was a twist in MacArthur's numbers. True, MacArthur committed himself to 200,000 occupational troops in Japan, but not in the Far East. The Pacific Theater was distinct in one substantial way from Europe, the difference was the Philippines. The United States had committed themselves to granting independence to the Philippines in 1946, but they were planning to retain many of their pre-war bases, and with them their American garrison troops. By the end of the war, most of MacArthur's troops were still in the Philippines and there was no reason to transport all of them to Japan, if the imperial government cooperated with the occupation authorities. MacArthur was confident that the Philippines would remain the hub for any future American military strategies in the Pacific. After the beginning of the occupation of Japan, about 230,000 troops were to stay in the Philippines. MacArthur's postwar levels were designed to fit War Department's general allocation (nearly 400,000 troops) for the whole Far East, and not only the occupation of Japan. But with the end of the war, the soldiers in the Philippines were left with no proper mission. Many were high point personnel and they spent their

30) Senate Doc. No. 90, United States Congress, Senate. *Demobilization of the Armed Forces*. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate on S. 1355, 79th Cong., 1st and 2^d Sess., Part 1. Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1945; also "Remarks by General of the Army George C. Marshall," 9-20-45. CCS 370.01 (8/25/45) Sec. 1, Central Decimal File 1946-47, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

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time waiting for the demobilization, which was not coming.³¹⁾

Until late 1945, they were told that insufficient shipping delayed their return.³²⁾ But after December, ships started to return home to the U.S. half empty. Demobilization also lagged. The critical score was lowered to 55, and after that, it lost most of its usefulness, as most of those with children, long overseas duty and battle credits were already gone. After Christmas, with no mission on a friendly soil, the soldiers in the Philippines grew homesick. On Christmas Day, a major demonstration of 4,000 men in Manila took place in front of the 21st Replacement Depot headquarters.³³⁾ In early January 1946 Secretary of War Patterson embarked on a world-wide inspection trip of overseas bases. This took place at the time when his War Department decided to scrap the point system. In an announcement on 4th January, the Army would put emphasis solely on the tour-of-duty, which would be 3.5 years in January, 2.5 years in April, and 2 years of service in July 1946. But here again, the War Department faced a challenge. General Marshall on 20th September 1945 promised that all men over 2 years of duty would be released “by late winter,” and that meant that the War Department statement in January indicated significant slowdown in demobilization. The announcement caused

31) Similar situation existed in many other places, but voicing of discontent was much more orderly, through Soldier's Committees, such as in Shanghai. See e.g., Secretary of War memorandum for the Chief of Staff, ABC 370.01 (10 Aug 44) Section 1-B, “American-British Conversations Correspondence Relating to Planning and Combat Operations,” 1940-1948, Record Group 165, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

32) “Use of Cargo Shipping for the Return of Military Personnel to the United States,” AG 370 (21 Sep 45) GD, 21 September 1945, 370 R&D AFPAC, File 6, Adjutant General, General Correspondence, 1944-46, Record Group 496, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

33) 26 December 1945, *The New York Times*.

widespread unfavorable public reaction. When the Secretary reached Hawaii he aggravated the matters further. On a press conference explaining the new demobilization, Secretary Patterson mentioned that he did not know the points stopped accumulating by the end of war.³⁴⁾ Demobilization slowdown and Secretary's ignorance resulted in an immediate reaction.

In Japan, Honolulu, Korea and Okinawa, protests were controlled and limited to several thousands, with much fiercer reaction in Guam. The situation was much more serious in the Philippines. On 6th and 7th January 1946, before Patterson arrived in Manila, the mobs of servicemen reached around 10,000 demanding answers from the local military commander Styer (AFWESPAC). Before the protests spread around the world to Europe, they caused consternation in MacArthur's headquarters. Morale of his soldiers plunged and together with growing dissatisfaction in Japan, the combination might get out of hands. The troop demonstrations had shaken the leadership, and triggered Congressional investigations. As a result, additional speed-up of demobilization was promised, the length of duty was clarified in points terms, the unjust calculation of points after the termination of the war was abandoned, non-essential personnel were returned immediately, and training of recruits was streamlined. The implementation changed the policy. And it also changed the way the occupation forces were to deal with Japan.³⁵⁾

34) 6 January 1946, *Stars and Stripes*, Pacific Edition, p.1.

35) The issue of the effect of the occupation army's demobilization on Japanese occupation cannot be dealt with here in detail. One effect was the well-known secret radio from MacArthur to the Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower on 25th January 1946 urging him to absolve the Emperor from the Tokyo trials and for retention of the Japanese imperial system. See "894.001 HIROHITO/1-2546," Decimal File, 1945-1949, State Department, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD., and also National Diet Library, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, Microform, Sheet No. SDDF(B)00065.

4. Conclusion

The distinction between policy formulation and policy implementation which was provided by Lasswell has been considered a useful analytical tool in policy analysis. But together with Lasswell, most policy research since then has tended to focus on the decision making stage and not on implementation. Pressman and Wildavsky refocused the studies to implementation, but their work was not without its limitations. Wildavsky shared with Lasswell the opinion that policy making is essentially an authoritarian process of making decisions at the top, and only then implementing them at the bottom.

However, experiences of those in the field were speaking different language. In 1980, Lipsky reversed the directionality and democratized decision making by introducing his concept of street-level bureaucrats. For Lipsky it was administrative discretion which provided implementing bureaucrats with relative autonomy from the top. In the field it was the street level bureaucrats who applied different strategies and interpreted different policies to suit their goals. It was them who were the real policy makers, not the ones on the top, far away from the reality in the field.

This article attempts to extend the challenge of both Wildavsky's and Lipsky's original arguments.³⁶⁾ Policy making does not end with a policy decision. Not only is implementation an integral part of policy process, it is often much

36) Smith, Kevin B. and Christopher W. Larimer. *The Public Policy Theory Primer*. Westview Press, 2009, 179; deLeon, Peter and Linda deLeon, "What Ever Happened to Policy Implementation? An Alternative Approach," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 12 (2002); pp.467-492; deLeon, Peter. *Democracy and the Policy Sciences*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.

more policy-relevant than the decision itself. There are two ways how policy may change in its implementation stage. One way is from below, as Lipsky aptly argues, and here it was exhibited by referring to MacArthur's overshooting, and by the revolt of the most street-level of bureaucrats, the soldiers themselves. The other challenge, however, comes not from below, but from the above of the decision making body. In this case, the "above" agency was Congress. Both challenges transformed the original demobilization policy. They changed the goals, targets, and the means that the military establishment, and especially the Army committed itself to. But the effects of such transformation extended far beyond the demobilization policy itself, since the occupation forces in Japan had to take substantive measures to cope with the deteriorating condition of their increasingly understaffed and badly trained troops. One of such measures would be, for the occupation Army, to commit itself into a closer cooperation with the Japanese government.³⁷⁾

37) Compel, Radomir. "Territoriality and Governance in the Early Postwar Japan and Okinawa, 1945-1946," *HIF Reports Journal*, Hosei University, 12 (2008): p.179. Acknowledgement: This research was funded by JSPS research grant no. 26780087.