The Lost Half-Decade Revived and Reconfigured: Sunagawa, 1956

HASEGAWA Kenji

Key words: 1955 system, Sunagawa, Korean War, Zengakuren, Shimizu Ikutarō

In the spring of 1945, Sunagawa, a village in western Tōkyō, was bombed by American B-29 bombers targeting the nearby Tachikawa Airbase; five years later, American B-29s busily flew off from the airbase to bomb Korea. In November 1951, one of those planes crashed into a neighborhood shortly after take-off.

As the two-year anniversary of the ceasefire in Korea approached in May 1955, the Tōkyō government sought cooperation from the Sunagawa mayor in requisitioning land needed for an expansion of Tachikawa Airbase that would effectively split the city in half. A local movement to oppose the proposed base expansion quickly spread. After two waves of protests, the first aided by the Japanese Socialist Party (hereafter JSP) and Sōhyō, and the second by Zengakuren, the base expansion was cancelled.

Recent works on social movements and nationalism in postwar Japan have underscored a rupture in the mid-1950s Japan, before and after the formation of the “1955 system”iii. Most have taken a progressive rather than declensionist view of the 1950s, stressing the important developments occurring after the mid-1950s. In his discussion of literary works dealing with the trope of in-betweenness, Yoshikuni Igarashi characterizes the second half of the 1950s as a period of rising nationalistic sentiment against the United Statesiii. James Orr’s analysis of the anti-nuclear movement shows how, despite limitations, it departed from its marginalized leftist status in the early 1950s and constructed a national antinuclear consensus that effectively checked post-Yoshida conservative efforts to rapidly remilitarize Japaniv. Wesley Sasaki-Uemura’s work on the 1960 Anpo protests shows that it resulted from new citizens movements that built up over the
latter half of the 1950s and displaced the “old paradigm” of activism represented by the Japanese Communist Party (hereafter JCP). The early 1950s of the JCP’s military struggle has typically been understood as a “lost half-decade.”

The history of the Sunagawa protests seems to dovetail with such progressive views of the 1950s. It was the first major Zengakuren (All Japan Federation of Student Governments) “struggle” after the rupture of the 6th Party Conference of 1955 and was strikingly different from the “struggles” of the early 1950s. The differences can be attributed to Zengakuren’s participation in a movement led by the JSP rather than the JCP. As the historian of postwar social movements Michiba Chikanobu notes, just as the JCP became increasingly marginalized through its adoption of military tactics in the early 1950s, anti-base protests led by the left faction JSP and Sōhyō spread as if to replace the JCP-led mass movements. Morita Minoru, the student who led Zengakuren’s participation in the Sunagawa protests, says that by breaking with the JCP and allying itself with the JSP in the mid-1950s, Zengakuren was able to gain a mass base that it had not previously had during the five years leading up to the 1960 Anpo protests. Zengakuren’s protests in Sunagawa took on a new form that succeeded in mobilizing an unprecedented number of students and in gaining the sympathy of the Japanese public. However, the Sunagawa protests cannot simply be understood as a reflection of, or resulting from an embrace of, the new mass style of activism exemplified in the anti-nuclear movement. In fact, much of the energy driving the protests derived from efforts to disrupt this very newness and to somehow revive the rapidly vanishing possibilities of the early postwar period.

The political contention of 1950 and 1960 tend to be considered as disparate events. Although the changes that took place during the intervening decade were of pivotal historical significance, one must not lose sight of the connections spanning the watershed decade. This paper will examine how the 1956 Zengakuren protests in Sunagawa was a crucial event that revived and reconfigured the “failed” student movement of the early 1950s, establishing a pattern of protest that was inherited in the more well-known 1960 Anpo protests.
Zengakuren and the JCP’s 1955 system

“The postwar has begun,” Mutō Ichiyō thought to himself in 1954\(^viii\). After participating in a series of protests during the Korean War peaking with demonstrations against the Anti-Subversive Acts Law in 1952, his Zengakuren entered a period of decline in activity. In an effort to regroup and gain student support, it started organizing singing and dancing events instead of demonstrations\(^ix\). As their illegal military activities were collapsing from within, Zengakuren leaders including Mutō were arrested en masse in March 1954. It may have been fortunate that they spent the few months of early 1954 in jail, when the JCP’s underground organization disintegrated under the impact of police crackdowns and internal spy-hunting. The cruel inhumanity of the JCP’s internal witch hunting campaign, dubbed the sōtenken undō (Comprehensive Inspection Campaign), drove some despaired activists to suicide, as depicted in the former Ogōchi sanson kōsakutai member Ko Samyong’s first novel, Yoru ga toki no ayumi wo kuraku suru toki (When Night Renders Dark the Footsteps of Time)\(^x\).

When Mutō was freed from prison in 1954, the party leadership told him to leave the student movement and put him to work on seemingly meaningless chores in the party’s youth organizations. This trying period in his life coincided with the advent of Japan’s postwar economic growth, when fluorescent light bulbs began replacing 20-watt incandescent bulbs\(^xi\). “If the air had color, it was gray up to that point. It seemed all of a sudden the air grew colorful,” Mutō recalls. Because his mood was so dark at the time, he felt all the more blinded by the new age’s brightness. As the young sipped Coca Cola in newly opened cafés, a mass movement against nuclear weapons sparked by the Lucky Dragon Incident adopted an open style that struck him as a completely new and alien style of political engagement. These disorienting changes inaugurated the start of the “postwar” for Mutō. This sense of a “postwar” rupture, coming not so much with the end of World War II as with the end of the Korean War, was shared by other young participants in the JCP’s military struggle\(^xii\). It was also shared by residents of areas like Sunagawa located near American bases or armaments factories suddenly revived in 1950 after a five year hiatus.
In 1954, the JCP’s military interlude was already well in decline and the party was moving toward a change in tactics. The 6th Party Conference in 1955 denounced the mistaken tendency of “extreme leftist adventurism” and stressed the need to build a broader mass base through more moderate tactics. In effect the party was signaling a second arrival of the “postwar.” In 1945, JCP leaders had enthusiastically embraced the “postwar” inaugurated by the American liberation forces, but with the Cominform criticism of January 1950 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June, optimism toward this “postwar” was decisively shattered. The Korean War showed that the “postwar” had actually not yet arrived. JCP activists hoped to foment revolution in Japan during the Korean War by conducting sabotage and by entering Sanson kōsakutai. The 6th Party Conference’s disavowal of early 1950s protests inaugurated the JCP’s “1955 system.” For many dedicated activists, this shift in party doctrine amounted to an abrupt and irresponsible order to demobilize.

However the resulting “6th Party Conference shock” did not come immediately. In its 1955 New Year edition, Akahata had emphasized the need to build mass support for the party. Many thought the 6th Party Conference decision was merely a repeat of this message. To clarify and reinforce the 6th Party Conference’s message, the party held a meeting of cell representatives the following month. Morita Minoru attended representing the Tōkyō University cell. At this meeting it became clear that the party was conducting a self-criticism of its early 1950s activities. Morita took detailed notes on the meeting and reported to cell members.

When the Literature Department members of the Tōkyō University cell met to discuss the 6th Party Conference, one student advanced the view that there was a “fundamental mistake concerning [the party’s] policy toward intellectuals.” Other students quickly followed up with similar comments:

“The 6th Party Conference’s statement on intellectuals is still insufficient. It mentions ‘correct leadership’ but what is that? It mentions ‘narrow-minded attitude’ but what is that?”
“After the 4th and 5th Party Conferences, the party has not clearly
formulated policy toward the student movement....This shows the party does not take students and intellectuals seriously.”

“I was made to feel unwelcome in my local party organization merely because of my student background....The workers look down on intellectuals but they also feel intimidated by the atmosphere of Tōkyō University and avoid coming here....There is no hope for the party if things are this way.”

“I am not saying that we don’t need to go to demonstrations or collect petitions for the peace movement. But it is not good if nothing is left of our lives as students....If we spend all our time doing political struggles, we will become even more isolated from students and we would become a brigade instead of a party, lumpen instead of students”.  

Students were harkening back to the early Zengakuren’s idea of students as a “stratum” able to contribute to the revolution, not merely allies of the proletariat. This idea became more clearly formulated in the period leading up to Zengakuren participation in the Sunagawa protests.

The Medical School students’ report on the 6th Party Conference stated that the root problem lay in “the party’s bureaucracy and our blind obedience.” “Bureaucratism,” it argued, allowed the party to impose mistaken policies onto students by turning a deaf ear to criticisms from below. Students, for their part, had ceased to think with their own heads and acquiesced to party orders. The “explosive” criticisms of party policy from student cell members were an auspicious sign that these twin evils could be overcome. A struggle to establish “intra-party democracy” had begun. Students had to continue this struggle to ensure that the party would not commit similar grave mistakes in the future. In the report, criticisms and doubts about the party leadership previously considered taboo poured forth: Why was the military policy formulated? What happened to the military organization? What was behind the party’s split in 1950? What was the sōtenken undō? What was the leadership’s policy on the role of students? How can the same leadership that committed such mistakes remain in their positions without conducting satisfactory self-criticisms?
This was not the first time that students criticized the party's "bureaucratism." The Zengakuren report of 1950 made essentially the same criticism. While the 1950 report criticized JCP authority by citing the international authority of the Cominform, students in the mid-1950s were re-thinking their role in the party on a more fundamental level even before international de-Stalinization. Medical School students lamented that actions based on mistaken policies had led to isolation and defeat. The doctors had killed the patient. Perhaps they had mistaken the diagnosis but it was also possible that the "basic theory" behind the diagnosis was mistaken. It was now necessary to perform a thorough autopsy to learn from their mistake. The unrepentant party leadership, avoiding this necessary process, continued to spew forth vague exhortations on building a mass base, and it blamed the panicky petit bourgeois elements in the party for dragging the party into the pitfall of "extreme leftist adventurism." "Enough of shūshin (moral education)," the exacerbated students appealed.

The sense of failure after the 6th Party Conference was much like the mood in 1947 after the abortive general strike, and the back-to-books tendency after the 1955 abandonment of military resistance paralleled a similar trend after the 1945 defeat of the wartime regime. Indeed, the new mood led some students to resume the postwar Shinjinkai's debate over subjectivity. However, behind the Tōkyō University cell's summation of the 6th Party Conference was an irrepressible urge for action. Like the first generation of Zengakuren students, but with a weaker respect for the party's authority, the Tōkyō University cell exerted relentless pressure on the party leadership. They vowed to "demand suitable and clear leadership" from the party while "furthering criticism" toward them. Shima Shigeo, who together with Morita Minoru became a leader of the post 6th Party Conference cell, was the principal figure behind this energetic pressure on the JCP leadership.

Zengakuren's first chairman Takei Teruo joined in criticism of the party, writing an opinion piece in a January 16, 1956 special issue of the Tōkyō University newspaper devoted to the rebuilding of the student movement. The root cause of the current predicament, he wrote, was the mainstream faction's usurpation of the movement in 1952. It was the JCP's duty to conduct a clear
self-criticism to assist students in reviving their movement\textsuperscript{xxiii}. Faculty members joined the discussion too. In the same issue, Yanaihara Tadao, who as the chair of the Liberal Arts Department had been vexed by the disruptive intensity of the Red Purge campus protests in 1950, expressed his puzzlement at the quiet studiousness of students. He appealed to them not to lose their “passion for peace”\textsuperscript{xxiv}. The young professor of German Yamashita Hajime seconded his appeal. The vigorous political debates so prevalent on the campus in 1950 had given way to singing voices, but now even the singing had ceased, leaving an eerie silence. The immediate threat of war seemed to have receded, he wrote, but the current political situation was even more critical than 1950. Plans were afoot to revise the constitution, and the American bases were expanding. While the world was moving toward national independence and peaceful coexistence, Japan’s domestic politics was moving in the opposite direction\textsuperscript{xxv}. If Japan continued on this path, it would become the “orphan” of Asia and of the world. Yamashita challenged students to reflect on the long-term implications of this situation and to revive their engagement in politics\textsuperscript{xxvi}. In April 1956 at Zengakuren’s 8\textsuperscript{th} Central Committee Meeting, regarded as the organization’s “second founding ceremony,” students answered Yamashita’s challenge. They drafted an appeal warning that Japan’s peace and democracy were in crisis and called for immediate action. Echoing the first generation Zengakuren students linking of the tuition raises to the BT (Board of Trustees) policy in 1948, they stressed the need to move beyond low-key actions and confront the larger political issues of the day\textsuperscript{xxvii}.

In reviving the student movement after the decline in activity of the mid-1950s, Zengakuren students rejected the 6th Party Conference’s failure to take responsibility for the failed military interlude and the ensuing internal spy-hunting. Like the first generation of Zengakuren students who had been spurred into action by their anger toward teachers who had instructed them to go die on the battlefields for the nation, they angrily criticized the JCP leadership for its irresponsible disavowal of the sacrifices young party members had made for the revolution in the early 1950s.
Shimizu Ikutarō and the JSP’s 1955 System

While Zengakuren students did not disagree with the party leadership’s criticism of the military interlude of the early 1950s as “extreme leftist adventurism,” they rejected the resulting turn toward moderate tactics. This rebellion against the JCP’s “1955 system” led to Zengakuren participation in the Sunagawa protests in 1956. Shimizu Ikutarō acted as a catalyst in channeling this post 6th Party Conference student energy into Sunagawa. Like Zengakuren leaders who rejected the JCP’s “1955 system,” Shimizu Ikutarō rejected the JSP’s “1955 system”: the reunification of the party’s left and right factions and the creation of a new Sōhyō under the leadership of Iwai Akira. Shimizu actively played the role of mediator in getting Zengakuren into Sunagawa.

The October 1951 issue of Sekai, focusing on the controversial San Francisco Peace Treaty and the arguments for a comprehensive peace by the Peace Problems Study Group (Heiwa mondai danwakai), sold 150,000 copies, roughly five times more than any previous sales figure. Contributing to this burst in sales was the left faction JSP, which purchased copies of the issue for distribution in the JSP party convention that month. The right and left factions of the JSP clashed at this convention, with the former supporting both the Peace and Anpo treaties and the latter opposing both. While the right faction proposed a compromise by supporting the Peace treaty and opposing the Anpo treaty, the Sōhyō hardliners were adamant in opposing both treaties and announced their intention to financially support the left faction of the party if the party split. The result was the division of the party into left and right factions, with close ties being forged among the left faction JSP, Sōhyō, and the Peace Problems Study Group.

Shimizu Ikutarō was one of the Peace Problems Study Group intellectuals invited to give talks at left faction JSP and Sōhyō sponsored meetings. During the course of the Sunagawa protests, Shimizu Ikutarō extended ties between the three groups and Zengakuren. In the first wave of protests against the base expansion in 1955, the JSP and Sōhyō reached an agreement with the government to cancel their mass mobilization at Sunagawa in exchange for a temporary halt of the government land survey for the project. The
Sunagawa residents were left to clash with police by themselves. The compromise reflected the more moderate orientation of Söhyö under its “1955 system.” At its 6th Congress in late July, Takano Minoru was replaced as secretary general by the less militant Iwai Akira, and shortly thereafter the left and right factions of the JSP re-united under a moderate platform. When the Hatoyama cabinet announced plans to resume the surveys in September 1956, Takano invited Morita Minoru to meet with Shimizu Ikutarö, who wanted Zengakuren to join the Sunagawa protests. What Morita remembers most vividly from this dinner was Takano’s intense hostility toward Iwai Akira, on whom the ousted leader continued to shower nasty epithets.

Shimizu shared Takano’s angry rejection of Söhyö’s and the JSP’s moderation under the 1955 system. In the early 1950s, when his popularity peaked, Shimizu’s writings were based on an anti-American nationalism paralleling that of the JCP. Takano’s favored protest tactic was the so-called gurumi tōsō, an adaptation of the JCP’s strategy of constructing regional revolutionary bases involving worker families and the local community in conducting strikes. In their own ways, Shimizu and Takano adapted and popularized the JCP’s 1951 platform.

Shimizu’s involvement with the base problem started with the protests against the American firing range in Uchinada (Ishikawa prefecture) in 1953. His reporting on these protests in the September 1953 issue of Sekai introduced the base problem to a wide audience, many of whom participated in the Sunagawa protests three years later. These protests were the first widely publicized case in the series of anti-base protests that peaked with the 1956 protests in Sunagawa.

In January 1954, Shimizu resolved that the new year would mark a new stage in the anti-base struggle. The left faction of the JSP had to transform itself into a political group that could organize local anti-base movements into a national movement against the Anpo system. The left faction JSP’s performance in Uchinada had been disappointing. Party members carefully avoided becoming too deeply enmeshed in the local protest out of obsessive fear of being associated with the JCP, and out of a resigned attitude toward the inevitability of the bases’ presence. Shimizu’s criticism of the left faction JSP echoed the Cominform’s
criticism of the JCP in 1950. He ridiculed the party’s “too bright” assessment of Japan’s political situation. Its assessment of postwar democracy read like a passage directly out of an American occupation report. It said that the conditions were not yet ripe for a socialist revolution even if the party succeeded in winning the elections and established a cabinet. In short, it was failing to fulfill its duty to struggle against the “colonial” American alliance. Since American forces would intervene to prevent Japan from ridding itself of the American bases, the party needed to overcome its soft stance and “confront head on the American military’s force” with courage. Sōhyō had set an encouraging precedent: although established under the Korean War with the support of SCAP, the moderate labor organization veered leftist to take an anti-American stand under the leadership of Takano Minoru. Sōhyō had undergone a metamorphosis from a “chicken” to a “duck.” In Uchinada, Shimizu said, the left faction JSP had not undergone this metamorphosis. “Left faction JSP, become a duck,” he urgedxxxiv.

Shimizu’s hope that the left faction JSP would adopt contentious political style of the early 1950s was not fulfilled. With the ousting of Takano Minoru in July 1955, Sōhyō partially metamorphosed back into a “chicken,” and with the reunification of the JSP in October 1955 under a moderate parliamentary platform, the JSP remained one. Shimizu angrily rejected the new moderation of the JSP and Sōhyō. It was his urge to revive the politically contentious style of the early 1950s—an urge that Zengakuren shared—that led him to support the Sunagawa protests. Like the JCP 1951 platform, Shimizu considered the presence of American bases in Japan to be a reflection of Japan’s “colonial” position. National affluence, he argued, remained an unachieved goal hampered by Japan’s colonial position in the American alliance.

Zengakuren and the Sunagawa Protests

In May 1955, the Tōkyō government sought cooperation from the newly elected mayor of Sunagawa in requisitioning land needed for the expansion of Tachikawa Air Base. Most residents of the cityxxxv lived along its central lifeline,
the Itsukaichi kaidō. The proposed base expansion would have cut through this main road and effectively split the new city in half. As word of the proposed base expansion spread quickly among the residents, some put up “off limits” signs on their land, imitating the signs demarcating the American bases. In the first session of the city legislature held under the new mayor, all members agreed to oppose the proposed requisitioning. The local opposition movement forged ties with Sōhyō and staged sit-in protests, singing “Mindoku” as they resisted police efforts to carry out the land surveys. Led by the local mulberry cultivator Aoki Ichigorō, violent clashes led by local residents and labor union activists ensued during September and November 1955. But in late 1955 a group of residents decided to pull out of the protests in favor of a compromise solution to “prevent bloodshed.” Iwai Akira, the new leader of Sōhyō, who worried that deaths might result from the protests, also withdrew the union’s support.xxxvi

Shimizu Ikutarō watched this development with mounting frustration. Through his mediation, Zengakuren responded with alacrity when the government’s surveys were re-initiated in fall 1956. On September 25, Zengakuren announced its action plan for Sunagawa. It announced that unlawful plans for base expansions in Japan were concentrated in October and November. The construction of military bases, as well as the Anpo treaty and administrative agreements, contravened Article 9 of the constitution. The effort to conduct the land surveys for the eviction of residents with the help of police force was against the law and against decency. If the government pushed ahead with the base expansion, it was the right and duty of Japanese people to resist. Although Zengakuren did not wish for a violent confrontation with the police, it would use whatever means necessary until the government backed down.xxxvii A local Zengakuren struggle headquarters was set up in Sunagawa, and beginning October 1, they mobilized a large number of students to enter Sunagawa and join the demonstrations. Hiring tour buses to bring students from college campuses to Sunagawa, Morita spoke to the passengers through the bus guide microphone to harden their resolve. At thirty-minute intervals, the buses stopped to let Morita change buses for another agitation speech.

Traveling to Sunagawa on tour buses from their campuses was
unthinkable for students entering the *sanson kōsakutai* just a few years earlier. So was the participation of a large number of “student masses” who could “naturally” join the protests. One student from Ochanomizu Women’s University described her entering Sunagawa in the following way:

For the half a year that I had been in college, everything was vague, I did not feel alive, I could not figure out what I was nor should be, and each day was stifling and frustrating....“Sunagawa” was in the news almost every day. The student government was appealing, “The expansion of Sunagawa is the first step toward making Japan a base for atomic and hydrogen bombs, and will threaten Japan’s peace. We wish for peace. Let us go to Sunagawa to protect Japan’s peace...” I felt no resistance to this logic, and to participate seemed to me a very natural thing.

She did not participate as a member of her student government, but rather went to Sunagawa with a friend from high school. There was “something casual” about her initial participation. However once in Sunagawa, she was overcome by intense anger.

The yam farms interspersed with old thatched-roofed houses ended with one metal fence. On the other side, a perfectly flat airfield extended itself with infinite vastness and arrogance...When I saw this for the first time...And when the American plane flew in low trying to disperse us, violently blowing up dust, I lay low in the ditch amidst the suffocating sandstorm and heard the student government flag snap. When I heard this, I felt for the first time an anger bordering on madness...piercing through me.

Like the students involved in the Uchinada protest, students going to Sunagawa took pains to help the residents and to avoid burdening them. They slept in the local school gym, and when they stayed in houses, they offered to tutor the children or work in the fields. The students were there to place themselves in the
front lines and have their bodies become the target of the police batons. Morita hoped that through such selfless actions, they could highlight their moral high ground and spread opposition to base expansion\textsuperscript{xxxix}. But Zengakuren leaders were also thinking of their own interests. They envisioned the Sunagawa protests as part of a larger string of protests stemming from the opposition to the Price Report and the anti-nuclear movement that would aid them in reviving the postwar student movement. They considered themselves not as assistants of, but as “allies” of the Sunagawa residents. Unlike the \textit{sanson kōsakutai} who sought to mobilize the residents or to serve them by becoming one with the local community, Morita thought of the Zengakuren-Sunagawa alliance as one of convenience based on a “dry” relationship\textsuperscript{xl}. The anti-base residents did not seem to mind. They spoke adoringly of the reliable and loveable \textit{gakuren-san} who would not even accept the miso soup that local women brought them\textsuperscript{xli}. Morita was pleasantly surprised by the residents’ warm welcome.

The first clash between Zengakuren students and police occurred on October 12. The police attacked the protestors, attempting to break up the scrum by removing individual protestors and physically pushing them away from the group through a tunnel lined by police officers. Determined students returned to the rear of the scrum to be “tunneled” multiple times. On October 13, a rainy day, the police stepped up the assault, and the number of injured protestors mounted. The clashes on the 12\textsuperscript{th} and 13\textsuperscript{th} resulted in approximately 500 injured and 4 arrests\textsuperscript{xlii}. On the 15\textsuperscript{th}, the government announced its decision to cancel the surveys, giving rise to euphoric celebration by the protestors\textsuperscript{xliii}.

In December 1956, Senaga Kamejirō, an activist in Okinawa’s protests against the American bases, was elected mayor of Okinawa’s capital city of Naha. The same month, an essay on the Sunagawa protests by the writer Hotta Yoshie appeared in the journal \textit{Chūō Kōron}. Hotta reflected on the rapid historical changes occurring in mid-1950s Japan. The “bright” faces of the protesting Zengakuren students were his proof of change. Hotta was struck that when students returned to the scrum after being beaten in the police “tunnel,” they did so in a matter of fact, nonchalant manner. Weeks after the bloody clash, Hotta visited the five injured students still hospitalized. Despite their painful injuries, they smiled cheerfully at
him. Thousands of protesters had joined to resist political authority without taking on an air of kamikaze-like romantic nihilism. Public opinion sided with the protesters, denouncing the police as the perpetrators of unjust violence. This was a historic moment, he thought, perhaps even the beginning of the end of the San Francisco Treaty system. His optimism proved unfounded, but his essay conveys the remaining sense of unpredictable flux of the time; and his hopes for intellectuals’ and Zengakuren’s efforts to disrupt the crystallization of the “1955 system.”

Sunagawa set an important precedent for the Bund’s later actions in the protests against Kishi Nobusuke’s efforts to revise the Anpo treaty in 1960. While the Sunagawa protests contrasted sharply with the protests of the early 1950s, similarities with the 1960 Anpo protests are striking. The sight of large numbers of unhelmeted and unarmed students clashing with police would reemerge on a larger scale in central Tōkyō with the Anpo protests. Future leaders of the Bund played leading roles in the Sunagawa protests. Their surprising success in the fall of 1956 conditioned their actions leading up to the 1960 protests. In 1956 these students were still JCP members. However, their actions in Sunagawa were conducted independently of the party, which remained in a state of disarray after the 6th Party Conference.

At the 7th Party Congress in July 1958, Miyamoto Kenji established authoritarian control in an effort to normalize conditions in the party. Shortly thereafter these Zengakuren students made a break with the party and established their own revolutionary vanguard. Again they acted independently of the party in organizing radical protests against, this time, the revision of the Anpo treaty. It was through the 1960 Anpo protests that “Zengakuren” became known abroad for the first time. However some of the main elements of their protests against 1960 Anpo—rebellion against the JCP, the urge to physically clash with authority, and discontent toward the 1955 system—were already in place with the Sunagawa protests of 1956.

Publishers, Inc.
Although the “1955 system” usually refers to the 1.5 party system that coalesced that year, this chapter uses the term in a wider sense to include the pivotal changes taking place in the realm of popular culture, war memories, and within the left, most notably the reunification and new moderation of the JCP and JSP.


This was parodied in Ōshima Nagisa’s movie *Nihon no yoru to kiri* (Japan’s Night and Fog). In one scene, disgruntled students complain among themselves that singing and dancing with girls had nothing to do with revolution. In the background, the dancing party ends and the organizer of the event exhorts, “Let us fight energetically again tomorrow!” *Nihon no yoru to kiri* was released on October 9, 1960, then banned three days later when Socialist leader Asanuma Inejiro was assassinated. Ōshima Nagisa, *Nihon no yoru to kiri* (Tōkyō: Gendai shichōsha, 1966), p.380.

Ko Samyon, *Yoru ga toki no ayumi wo kuraku suru toki* (Tōkyō: Chikuma shobō, 1971)


Nor was it a general phenomenon for all JCP students. Campuses where students became most deeply involved in the military tactics under the 1951 platform like Tōkyō University, Waseda University, and Tōkyō Education University, were most affected by the 6th Party Conference. “Places like Tōkyō Women’s University don’t seem to be much affected,” reported a Tōkyō University student. “They told me it was annoying for us to speak of things like ‘rokuzenkyō neurosis’.” Nihon kyōsantō Tōkyō daigaku saibō bungakubu han, “Rokuzenkyō no ketsugi ni tsuiteno bungakubu han no tōron” (October 25, 1955).

Nihon kyōsantō Tōkyō daigaku saibō rinji iinkai, “Saibō no genjō to tō kensetsu no hōkō nitsuite—rokuzenkyō no rikai to jissen no tameni” (November 17, 1955)

Nihon kyōsantō Tōkyō daigaku saibō bungakubu han, “Rokuzenkyō no ketsugi ni tsuiteno bungakubu han no tōron” (October 25, 1955).

Zengakuren’s April 1956 appeal, for example, reminded readers that students had played the leading role in the movement to protect peace in the postwar period. The Japanese people had high expectations for students, with their “youthful passion and intellect,” to rise up again. Zengakuren shokikyoku, “Zengakuren dai 8 kai chūō iinkai ippanhōkoku, sengen,” (April 4-6, 1956) *SSGU* v.4, p.11-15


Nihon kyōsantō tōdai saibō igakubuhan shidōbu, “Tōdai no tō no tadahii saishuppatsu no tameno kinkyū no kadai—hōkoku to teian” (October 1955).


Nihon kyōsantō Tōkyō daigaku gakusei saibō rinji iinkai, “Saibō no genjō to tō kensetsu no hōkō ni tsuite—rokuzenkyō no rikai to jissen no tameni” (November 17, 1955)
Morita Minoru, *Sengo sayoku no himitsu*, p.90.

Takei Teruo, “Kono chintai wa nazeka—kagakuteki hōshin no ketsujo wo kokufuku seyo,” *Tōkyō daigaku gakusei shinbun* (January 16, 1956), p.2. In the period after the 6th Party Conference, Shima and other JCP student cell members visited Takei often for advice on reconstructing the student movement. Takei’s theory of students as a “stratum” formulated during the Red Purge protests was useful in reviving their movement. However Takei’s influence did not last long as soon the students started to move toward Trotskyist ideas. Nihon shuppan sentā ed., *Nihon kyōsantō—watashi no shōgen* (Tōkyō: Nihon shuppan sentā, 1970), p.117.


In a similar vein, the political scientist Sakamoto Yoshikazu pointed out in a 1963 essay that the mid-1950s relationship between the “international Cold War” and Japan’s “domestic Cold War” underwent an unprecedented shift. While in the early postwar period Japan’s “domestic Cold War” lagged behind the deterioration of the “international Cold War,” the mid-1950s relaxing of international tensions did not result in an amelioration of the “domestic Cold War,” but rather its further escalation. Sakamoto Yoshikazu, “Nihon ni okeru kokusai reisen to kokunai reisen,” in *Chikyūjidai no kokusai seiji* (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 1990), p.133.


Itō Makio et al., *Sunagawacho gassenroku*, p.156-159.

Nihon rōdōkumiai sōhyōgikai ed., *Sōkyō nijūmenshi* (Tōkyō: Rōdō shunpōsha,


xxxiii Michiba Chikanobu, “Kakushin kokumin undō to chishikijin,” p.201.


xxxv Sunagawa achieved city status in June 1954.

xxxvi Itō Makio et al., Sunagawachō gassenroku, p.11-17,108,156-158.


xxxviii Matsushita Minako, “‘Heiwa’ e no shikō wo kizamareta Sunagawa jiken,” Asahi jānaru, (December 20, 1959), p.16-18

xxxix Morita Minoru, Sengo sayoku no himitsu, p.143.


xiii Morita Minoru, Sengo sayoku no himitsu, p.130-145. One of the onlookers from inside the base was a nineteen year old Dennis Banks, the Native American activist who co-founded the American Indian Movement (AIM), who was stationed in Tachikawa air base at the time. Watching the clash between demonstrators and police sparked his interest in issues of power and discrimination. Hoshi Kiichi ed., Sunagawa tōso 50 nen sorezore no omoi, p.212.

失われた5年間の再生・再構築：1956年、砂川

長谷川 健治

【キーワード】1955年体制、砂川、朝鮮戦争、全学連、清水幾太郎

1956年の砂川基地拡張反対運動は、前年の6全協による共産党の武装闘争方針の放棄で50年代前半の共産党系の運動スタイルが破綻した後、この時代と繋がった新しい大衆性をもった抗議運動の発端と見られることが多い。確かに、1956年の抗議運動は山村工作隊と火炎瓶闘争に象徴される朝鮮戦争期のそれとは大きく異なる面が多かった。しかし、1950年代前半の「古い」運動スタイルは単に過去に葬られたわけではないし、原水禁運動に象徴された「新しい」大衆的なスタイルは無条件に採用されたわけでもなかった。

本稿は日本共産党と総評の「55年体制」がいかに全学連を砂川に導きいれたかに焦点をあてる。具体的に、日本共産党の6全協が学生活動家に与えた影響、当時反基地運動に活発に関わっていた清水幾太郎の役割、砂川における学生の抗議スタイル等を分析するところによって、1956年、砂川において、1950年代前半の「失われた5年間」がいかに再生・再構築されたかを辿っていく。