Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Japan
Faculty of Economics, Yokohama National University, Japan = 横浜国立大学経済学部
抄録
This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information. Uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors of agents who have either Bewley's incomplete preferences or Gilboa–Schmeidler's maximin expected utility preferences. The main results characterize interim efficient allocations under uncertainty; that is, they provide conditions on the sets of posteriors, thus implicitly on the way how agents update the sets of priors, for non-existence of a trade which makes all agents better off at any realization of private information. For agents with the incomplete preferences, the condition is necessary and sufficient, but for agents with the maximin expected utility preferences, the condition is sufficient only. A couple of necessary conditions for the latter case are provided.
雑誌名
Journal of Economic Theory
巻
144
号
1
ページ
337 - 353
発行年
2009-01
ISSN
00220531
書誌レコードID
AA0024175X
DOI
info:doi/10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.006
権利
NOTICE: This is the author's version of a work accepted for publication by Elsevier. Changes resulting from the publishing process, including peer review, editing, corrections, structual formatting and other quality control mechanisms, may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been to this work since it was submitted for publication.
Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty
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