Yokohama Natl Univ, Fac Econ, Hodogaya Ku, Yokohama, Kanagawa 2408501, Japan = 横浜国立大学経済学部
抄録
This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturbances. It explains the connection between the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria, where large noise is required, and the uniqueness of equilibria in global games, where small noise is required. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
雑誌名
Games and Economic Behavior
巻
57
号
2
ページ
361 - 369
発行年
2006-11
ISSN
08998256
DOI
info:doi/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.018
権利
NOTICE: This is the author's version of a work accepted for publication by Elsevier. Changes resulting from the publishing process, including peer review, editing, corrections, structual formatting and other quality control mechanisms, may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been to this work since it was submitted for publication.
Correlated quantal responses and equilibrium selection
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