Kyoto Univ, Inst Econ Res, Sakyo Ku, Kyoto 6068501, Japan
Yokohama Natl Univ, Fac Econ, Yokohama, Kanagawa 240, Japan = 横浜国立大学経済学部
抄録
This paper considers a two-agent model of trade with multiple priors. Firstly, we characterize the existence of an agreeable bet on some event in terms of the set of priors. It is then shown that the existence of an agreeable bet on some event is a strictly stronger condition than the existence of an agreeable trade, whereas the two conditions are equivalent in the standard Bayesian framework. Secondly, we show that the two conditions are equivalent when the set of priors is the core of a convex capacity. These results are also related to the no trade theorems under asymmetric information. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
雑誌名
Journal of Economic Theory
巻
128
号
1
ページ
299 - 305
発行年
2006-05
ISSN
00220531
DOI
info:doi/10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.004
権利
NOTICE: This is the author's version of a work accepted for publication by Elsevier. Changes resulting from the publishing process, including peer review, editing, corrections, structual formatting and other quality control mechanisms, may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been to this work since it was submitted for publication.
Agreeable bets with multiple priors
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